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Abstract
This thesis presents a confrontation between two ways of conceiving self-other relations
and community. For Edmund Husserl, the unity of the selfhas a primary and
categorically privileged position in the constitution of the community of persons. His
epistemological concem with certainty seems to make this prioritization of unity
necessary. For Gilles Deleuze, the self does not have a categorically privileged position.
The unity of the selfis not conceived as primary and irreducible, but as constituted out of
difference, or differential components. Because unity is not prior, others are conceived as
playing a primary and fundamental role in the constitution of the self. A Deleuzian
conception of community is therefore based on the reciprocal relations between selves,
and not grounded on the constituting activity of the transcendental ego. I argue that the
Deleuzian account is more faithful to experience in recognizing an essential passivity in
the way selves are constituted and interact to form a community.
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Introduction
The problem that has been the impetus for the writing of this thesis is one that I initially
encountered in the work of Edmund Husser!. In the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations,
Husserl attempts to show how a transcendental subject constitutes other subjects , and how
these subjects together constitute an intersubjective community and an objective world of
communally constituted meanings. In doing this he must reconcile two claims that are
central to his phenomenology. The first is that all of one's experiences and meanings are
constituted and given unity exclusively by one's personal intentional processes. The
second claim is that all objects of consciousness are constituted against the pre-given
background of intersubjectivity. In other words, objects of consciousness are given as
objective and constituted in tandem with others even though one can only be directly
aware of one's own constitution of them.
The tension between these two claims in Husserl's philosophy is interesting
because it poses the problem of how one can conceive of a community and of a collective
constitution of the world even when one's account of experience begins from the unity of
a transcendental subject. The question arises as to whether this is an adequate explanation
of the relation between individuals and the collective, between the unity that is a
community and the different individuals that compose that unity. Is a concept of
community or intersubjectivity, that is, a grouping of heterogeneous selves, adequately
conceived if experience is grounded on the unity of a transcendental subject?
Part of my position in this thesis will be that Husserl's theory of how selves
communally constitute the world is inadequate. This inadequacy can be traced to the fact
that his theory of intersubjectivity in Cartesian Meditations pivots on the idea that an
autonomous and universal subject is the necessary ground of our experience and
constitution of the world. Such a theory has no room for real otherness, since any other
would be reducible to the unity of the transcendental subject that constitutes the others.
Prioritizing the unity of the transcendental ego in this way precludes any truly reciprocal
constitution between self and other since the self is categorically privileged. What must
be achieved in order to formulate a proper theory of inter subjectivity is a balanced notion
of the reciprocal constitution that occurs between selves. I will demonstrate that in
prioritizing the autonomous self, Husser! merely pays lip service to such reciprocity.
Because all constitution is for Husserl ultimately reducible to the activity of the isolated
and autonomous ego, it becomes problematic to speak of the communal constitution of
meaning.
The ideas of Gilles Deleuze, as expressed in his own writings as well as those co-
authored with his occasional partner in writing Felix Guattari, will be of help to us in
achieving an adequate conception of how selves communally construct the world and
reciprocally constitute each other.' Deleuze does not maintai!1 the priority of the self and
the unity it constitutes and represents. For Deleuze, unity is not prior, as it is for Husser!.
Instead, difference is prior, and out of difference a unified world and unified selves are
constructed. The value that Deleuze ascribes to difference is essential to understanding
why the theory of community or intersubjectivity that can be derived from his philosophy
is more adequate than Husserl's theory of inter subjectivity. On Deleuze's view, selves are
I It is beyond the purview of this paper to explore the extent to which the ideas expressed in Deleuze's
solitary writings differ from those expressed in his writings with Guattari.
not a priori unities, but a posteriori constructions. They are constructed out of components
of difference. Other persons are sources and examples of such components. This means
that the self is not prior to the other, but is fundamentally dependent on its relations with
others in order to be what it is. There is a reciprocal exchange of constitutive influence
between selves. One cannot perceive, communicate with, help, or hurt another person
without being reconstituted. One cannot change another without changing oneself. This
reciprocity, based on the idea of difference underlying unity, is what makes a Deleuzian
theory of community or intersubjectivity better than the Husserlian theory. On a
Deleuzian view, the unity of a community is not reducible to the unity of the isolated ego,
but is constructed out of the reciprocal interactions between the members of the
community. Thus, I will argue that a theory of heteronomous subjectivity, one that
conceives the self as constituted and determined by others, rather than one that conceives
all othemess as constituted on the basis of the self, can remedy the problem posed by
Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. It is only when selves are to a great degree
heteronomous, or constituted by others , rather than autonomous, or constituted by
themselves, that the world can be said to be constituted inter~ubjectively,or by the many.
In his writings, Deleuze offers us ways of thinking about heteronomous selfhood.
For him, the self is not centred and autonomous; it is not sufficient by itself, as it is for
Husserl, to give unity to experience. For Husserl, each self is an autonomous, yet identical
or universal, mechanism for the ordering of perceptual data into unified objects and a
unified world. The selfis an abstract point upon which all differences converge and unify.
Other persons are manifestations of such differences. Othemess is a meaning built upon
the model of one's personal experience of selfhood. On this view, others are at base the
same as the self. A Deleuzian view ofselfhood dispenses with the priority of the self. It
would conceive of a self as a necessary openness to difference, to the becoming-other or
the becoming-new that characterizes all experience. For Deleuze, selfhood is becoming-
other; it is equal to how one is determined and modified by others, whether these others
be other persons, the different foods we eat, or the technologies we utilize in our daily
activities. In this way, Deleuze rejects the dualism intrinsic to Husser!'s model of
selfhood . For Husser!, the ego acts as a mechanism that gives order and unity to the flux
of perception. It gives form to the matter of existence. Deleuze proposes a monism in
which the self is no longer strictly separate from what is in its vicinity. Instead, the self is
suffused throughout its surrounding field or territory. It is a fluid gathering-in of
otherness, of difference.
My contention in this thesis is that a theory of heteronomous selfhood makes for a
more coherent account of intersubjectivity. A theory of intersubjectivity derived from a
notion of autonomous selfhood is unsatisfactory primarily because in the reciprocal
relations between subjects, the constitutive power of the selfis categorically privileged. A
Deleuzian way of thinking about selfhood allows the constitutive relations between
heteronomous selves, rather than the necessary structure of autonomous selves, to be the
underpinning ofa theory of inter subjectivity. Conceiving community in this way means
that in the reciprocal relations between selves, no party is categorically privileged. If one
party does have greater constitutive power than another, then it does not possess this
power absolutely and necessarily by virtue of it being conceived as the autonomous
centre of constitutive activity.
But it is also my contention that a strict Deleuzian account of the self-other
relation is not adequate. The fault lies in Deleuzes insistence on giving difference
priority over unity in our experience. In effect, he reverses the order of priority that
Husserl advocates. Unity is produced by difference for Deleuze, rather than difference
being grounded in unity. I will demonstrate that an account of experience that is truer to
experience can be achieved if we conceive of difference and unity as codependent, rather
than one being prior to the other. It will be argued that unity and difference are
inextricably linked . Unity necessarily differs, and differences are necessarily unified.
Conceiving them as such will allow for a coherent account of the self-other relation that is
true to experience.
I will begin the main part ofthis thesis with an analysis of Husserl's
phenomenology of the self-other relation and intersubjectivity. Without intending to
reduce Husserl's philosophy to just one of his methodological approaches, my focus will
be his 'static analysis' of these phenomena since this analysis presents most clearly how
the self-other relation can be grounded on the unity of the transcendental subject. My
claim will be that real otherness cannot be conceived in this way and that truly reciprocal
relations between self and other are not conceivable on this view.
I will then turn to Deleuze. In much of his thought, pure ununified difference is
metaphysically primary. Unity is conceived as arising out of difference as a secondary
phenomenon. I will demonstrate that this theory, as an account of our experience, is
problematic and that there are other aspects of De leuze's philosophy that allow for a more
coherent account of the relation between unity and difference in experience. By following
this thread of his thought we will be enabled to achieve an account of the self-other
relation which gives priority to neither difference nor unity, but which sees the self and
any community of selves as a unity that differs, i.e. as a unified set of differences which is
in flux. Such unities are open in that they cannot be reduced to the differences that
compose them, for the rearrangement of differences and the introduction of new
differences are always possibilities. Employing the principle of the codependence of unity
and difference will finally allow us to achieve a theory of the communal constitution of
meaning and the world which escapes the Husserlian paradox that intersubjective
constitutions are ultimately reducible to the intentional processes of the isolated
transcendental ego .
Chapter 1:
Husserl's Phenomenology of Self, Other, and Intersubjectivity
1.1 The Problem ofIntersubjectivity
Edmund Husserl's phenomenology has two broad concerns: to show through a pure
description of consciousness how it is that we constitute objects of consciousness, and to
show that a certain class of these objects - the idealities of logic, mathematics, and the
natural sciences - are indubitable. The former concern is the method through which the
latter is to be achieved.
Husserl's approach to addressing his epistemological concerns involves an
exploration of the most general and essential features of consciousness. To do this he
emplo ys the method of phenomenological 1m0 xiJ (epoch e). The epoche excludes or
parenthesizes any theoretical constructs or hypothetical interpretations of what is given in
consciousness. One overarching theory that Husserl brackets is the "natural thesis", or
"natural attitude". This common-sense theory proposes the existence of a world of
actuality external to any particular conscious subject, a wor!d that includes other
conscious subjects. For Husser!, the truth of this thesis is not intuitively self-evident. As a
result, our belief in it must be put aside so that we might discover through the direct
experience of phenomena those features of consciousness that are self-evident and
essential. In order to avoid implicating logical principles in this foundation, i.e. in order to
avoid presupposing the very thing he wishes to ground, Husser! turns to a project of pure
phenomenological description which attempts to describe the phenomena of
consciousness simply as they are given, without any overlaying of theoretical constructs.
By means of this method, Husser! hopes to secure a finn ground for all scientific ways of
knowing. Through phenomenological description, the a priori form of all conscious
experience, that is, of the world as it appears to us, is supposed to be revealed.
The phenomenological epoche has the effect of restricting one to a
phenomenological description of one's own conscious processes. The essential form of all
consciousness is hereby revealed. There are a number of aspects to this essential form.
Firstly, consciousness is always consciousness ofsome object. Husserl calls these objects
"noemata" (singular, "noema"), Secondly, we are always conscious of objects by way of
some act of consciousness. Husserl calls these acts of consciousness "neeses" (singular,
"noesis"). Thirdly, there is the transcendental ego, the identity pole or point of
convergence for all the acts of consciousness and objects of consciousness constituted by
those acts . The transcendental ego is like an abstract point where objects of consciousness
are presented and represented and coexist to form a unified self and a unified world.
Thus, consciousness is not only necessarily consciousness ofsome object, but also
necessarily consciousness for some transcendental ego.
This analysis of the necessary form of experience presents us with a difficulty.
This is because Husserl claims to solve the problem of the constitution of an objective
world by means of a method that depends at every level, and particularly at its
foundation, on the constituting activity of an isolated transcendental ego. Husser! must
therefore address the question of how his method can take account of the meaning of
another subject, a meaning that necessarily entails that the subject who constitutes the
other cannot experience the other's conscious processes immediately, i.e. cannot
constitute them in an apodictic manner. Husser! believes that his phenomenology can
demonstrate how the meaning of others is constituted in consciousness, and how it is that
meaning in general can be constituted, not only subjectively by an isolated ego, but also
intersubjectively by a community of egos. He believes that he can do this with certainty
and without any violation of his method . We will see that although Husserl does achieve
an account of the meaning of the other, the otherness of the other is severely
compromised because of the dependence of this meaning on the constituting
transcendental ego .
1.2 The Static Phenomenology ofthe Other: An Attempt to Solve the Problem oj
Intersubj ectivity
In the Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere. i Husserl uses the static phenomenological
method in an attempt to solve the problem of intersubjectivity. The static approach
favours a synchronic rather than a diachronic analysis of consciousness. Inother words,
unlike diachronic, or "genetic", analysis, it does not attempt to describe how
consciousness constructs over time the meanings "other ego" and "intersubjective
community". Husserl's diachronic theories of how consciousness develops posit that the
distinction between pre-social and social subjectivity is not a natural feature of
consciousness. In other words, the awareness of self does not precede in time the
awareness of a community of others. Instead, they develop in tandem with each other.
The strict distinction between pre-social and social subjectivity is arrived at only by
2 The static phenomenological approach is evident in the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations. It is also
employed in Husserl's analyses in the second book of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy , and to a lesser extent in the The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology. In my explication of Husserl 's static phenomenology of the other and
intersubje ctivity, I will be drawing mainly upon the Cartesian Meditations , but also his second book of
Ideas.
means of static abstr action .' Static abstraction, or static analysis, attempts to understand
how an already formed self constitutes other persons as objects of consciousness (noema)
on the basis of its own directly perceived intentional processes. It attempts to isolate the
form or essence of the experience of others in the moment of its occurrence, rather than
exploring how the meanings of "ego", "other ego", and "intersubjective community" have
developed over time.
In line with his interest in epistemology and concern for truth , static
phenom enology begins from what Husser! believes to be an indubitable certainty: the
transcendental ego, the necessary subject of all constitutional acts of consciousness, the
necessary correlate of all constituted objects . This is given with complete self-evidence in
each moment of consciousness. Beginning with the certainty of the transcendental ego,
Husserl must show how the sense of a whole community of subjects, who together
constitute an objective world of shared meanings, is possible. There are three main steps
to his explication. The first is a description of the primordial sphere, or sphere of
ownness. This level of consciousness is arrived at by means of a special epoche that is
perform ed in addition to the standard phenomenological epoche ." This additional epoch e
is unique because it occurs within the phenomenological attitude of consciousness, rather
than functioning to bring us into that attitude. i It is necessary because in the usual
phenom enological attitude intersubjective meanings are not bracketed, even though one is
3 Edmund Husse r!, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomeno logical Philosophy.
Second Book, Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuw er (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publ ishers,
1989),2 03.
~ Edmund Husser!, Cartesia n Medita tions, Trans. Dorion Cai rns (The Hague: Martinu s Nijhoff, 1960), 95.
5 A. D. Smit h, Husser l and the Cartesian Meditations (London: Routl edge, 2003), 216 .
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restricted to one's own intentional processes." Even after one has performed the usual
phenomenological epoche, one does not experience the world as one's own exclusive
"private synthetic formation". Rather, it is experienced as available and accessible to
others. It is experienced as an intersubjective world in the sense that it exists in itself in
isolation from any particular subject's consciousness of it.' The special epoche of the fifth
meditation restricts us to only those intentional processes and objects that are given
immediately in consciousness. In this way, one sets aside consciousness of the
perspectives on the world that other subjects constitute. There is at this level of analysis a
sort of nature, a primordial nature that includes only what has been, is, or can potentia lly
be constituted originally, that is, with indubitable certainty, by the isolated subject. In this
sphere, all that is alien or other - that is, other subjects and objective nature in general - is
put aside, for these meanings involve more than what is present immediately to
consciousness. In the second step, Husserl shows how the meaning of another subject is
constituted. While this takes place within the primordial sphere, it includes perceptions
that cannot be made present to the subject in an immediate way. From here, Husserl
moves on to the constitution of nature as objective, or as "intersubjectively common".8
In the primordial sphere, one's own body is unique in several important ways.
Firstly, it is constituted as the perceptual origin, the here from which all else is perceived,
and in relation to which all else receives positional predicates. Secondly, one's body is
moved in a direct manner, and is employed to move all foreign objects. As Husserl says,
it is the only body in primordial consciousness that is ruled and governed immediately by
~ Husserl , MeditatioIlS , 89.
8 ~:l~~'e;l~ ·Ideas, 179.
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the subject. f One does not experience this movement through third person observation,
but through an immediate awareness of the ability to move at will. Thirdly, the body is
one's "locus of feelings", both emotional and sensory. It is the only body in the
primordial sphere with "fields of sensation". 10 These three primary characteristics of how
one's body is experienced allow it to be identified through perception, such as in the case
of seeing a hand as one's own and distinguishing it from the hand of another. Only one's
own body can be constituted originally in this way. Husserl's explication of the
constitution of the other must show how we come to perceive a foreign object as
'sensitive, as active, and as the null-centre of perspectives on the world'. 11 In short, a
foreign body must be recognized "as something that is originally constituted in an alien
sphere of ownness", 12 similar to how our own bodies are constituted as animate in our
personal spheres of ownness.
To perceive an object as a sentient other is to constitute it as a centre of
consciousness distinct from one's own whose conscious processes cannot be intuited by
the original subject in a direct manner. This indirect form of intuition or presentation is
called "apperception". If the subjective processes and perceptions of an other could be
given originally, they would be part of one's own essence and the other's sensuous modes
would be experienced as part of one's own psychophysical unity.l ' But they are not, and
cannot possibly be made present to the constituting subject. This mediate form of
9 Husserl, MeditatiollS, 97 .
:~ Ibid .
Smilh,221 .
:~ Ibid. ..
Husserl,MedltatlOlls,109.
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intentionality is necessary to the constitution of the other , for without it self and other
would be indistinguishable.
The term "apperception" also refers to the co-presentation, or accompanying
presentation, of a perspective on an external object that is blocked from view . In other
words, when I see an object, such as a mountain or a tree, standing before me, it is evident
that accompanying this visual presentation is the assumption that it is possible to take a
different perspective on this object. At the moment, I do not directly perceive these other
perspectives, but along with what I am presented with directly in consciousness is the
"co-presentation" or apperception of another side . I have a vague expectation of what it
would look like . I anticipate that I could make the other side directly present to my
consciousness by changing my position in relation to it. However, whereas this sort of
apperception is linked with the possibility of an original presentation or "verification", the
apperception of another subject's constituting processes cannot possibly be moved to
presence.14
The recollection of a past present is also similar to how an other is intuited within
the sphere of ownness. Just as recollections transcend the "living present", and are
therefore not immediately present to the ego, the other transcends one's primordial
consciousness. IS Again, the difference is that while recollections were once directly
present in consciousness, an other's mental processes can never be. Other transcendental
14 Ibid .
15 Ibid ., 115.
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subjects are therefore not given with "unqualifiedly apodictic evidence".16 They are
intended through "[a] certain mediacy ofintentionaluy'F ' that cannot be made immediate.
Despite this mediacy, Husser! contends that the intentionalities involved in the
constitution of an other must allow one to transcend the primordial sphere toward
intersubjective awareness. 18 Husser! sets it down as a principle that any such
transcendence beyond what is present originally must be based upon a core of actual
presentation. 19 Husserl finds this core in the similarity between the physical appearance of
one's own body and the body of that object, present in the primordial sphere, which will
come to be constituted as an other. The apperception of the other's consciousness requires
what Husserl calls the "pairing" of the visual presentation of its external physical body
with the apperception of one 's own body as it would look if one were to see it from
"there" rather than "here", i.e. if one were to step outside one's body and see it from a
distance, as ifit were an object of perception like any other. The similarity of the
objective presentations of these bodies serves as the basis for a transference of the sense
"transcendental subject" from the original subject to the other . What is transferred to the
object and thereby made co-present along with the presentation of its bodily appearance is
the notion of it being a "here" in relation to which all else is "there".2o Subjective bodily
sensations and psychic acts are also made co-present with the foreign object." Thus, for
Husserl, the physical is the "founding level" of the psychological reality of the other. 22
16 Ibid ., 149.
17 Ibid., 109.
18 Ibid. , 105.
19 Ibid., 109-110 .
20 Husserl , Ideas, 176.
21 Ibid., 172-174 .
22 Ibid. , 358 .
14
Pairing involves what Jeffery W. Brown calls "an analogizing transfer of an
original sense to a new instance".23 This means that when one intends an object as an
other, it becomes a subordinate instance of the sense "transcendental ego", a sense that is
already directly present in the primordial sphere. It is therefore an "enriching" of this
original meaning." not a radical departure from it or a rupture of its unity. As we have
already said, one does not directly experience the intentional processes of an other. But by
means of pairing, such generic processes, known originally only through one's own
constituting activity, become associated with an external object.
Husserl does assert, however, that there is a certain degree of reciprocity involved
in pairing. The analogizing transfer of meaning from self to other entails a reciprocal
transfer from other to self. As a result, how one conceives the meaning of oneself as a
conscious subject is altered through the experience of others. Pairing is therefore the
constitution of the other and the simultaneous reconstitution of one's sense of being a
particular transcendental ego. 25 But despite this reciprocity, it remains the case that the
self retains logical primacy and otherness remains subordinate to the self. Husserl upholds
a metaphysical schema that gives unity, here in the guise of the transcendental ego,
primacy over difference, which is present here in the form of other persons who are
constituted by the transcendental ego.
The upshot of this analysis is that the other's body is the first objective thing to be
constituted; it is the first thing to be constituted as identical in two primordial spheres - in
23Jeffery W. Brown, "What Ethics Demands of Intersubjectivity: Levinas and Deleuze on Husserl,"
International Studies in Philosophy 34(1) (2002): 26.
24 Ibid., 26.
25 Ibid., 26-27.
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one's own and in the other's.i" This is because, after pairing, an object of consciousness
has the sense of having its own sphere of ownness analogous to the original subject's
sphere of ownness. The object therefore "transcends any single sphere of own ness", and
becomes objective.i " In other words, we have here an "intersubjective co-constitution".28
The other's body thus becomes the first of many such 'possible intentional intersections
between my sphere of own ness and another's'i"
A consequence of the objectification of the world is that each subject becomes one
among many centres of consciousness whose perspectives are but appearances of the
world as it exists objectively.3D The ego-community that is formed as a result of the
constitution of others is supposed by Husserl to possess an "intersubjective sphere of
own ness" through which the objective world is constituted." The objective world is an
intrinsic part of this sphere's essence, just as primordial nature is part of the essence of
the subjective sphere of ownness.
1.3 The Problem ofIntersubjectivity Unsatisfactorily Solved
It is a shortcoming ofHusserl's static analysis ofothemess mOat it does not allow the
transcendental ego any direct knowledge of other subjects. It asserts that there are certain
objects that the ego constitutes as other conscious subjects, but there is never any
apodictic evidence that these entities are actually present to themselves as constituting
26 Husserl,MeditatioI/S, 124.
27 Smith , 227.
28 1bid., 231.
29 1bid., 232.
30Husserl, MeditatioI/S, 129.
31 Ibid ., 107.
subjects. This is a necessary consequence of the fact that the stream of conscious
processes that is apperceived when one experiences another subject cannot become
present to the original experiencing subject. Because other streams of consciousness can
only be apperceived, there is no indubitable proof for the constituting activity of other
subjects. Husser! insists on a necessary distinction between what is present to oneself and
what is present to an other. But this distinction is entirely subsumed within the sphere of
an isolated consciousness. Husser! has therefore not presented indubitable evidence for
the objective existence of others in isolation from one's experience and constitution of
them. 32
This problem of solipsism has consequences for intersubjective phenomenology.
In the Cartesian Meditations Husser! tries to give intersubjective phenomenology an
epistemological status that is equal to, although methodologically different from, that of
subjective phenomenology. f In terms of phenomenological method, the subjective level
of inquiry must precede the intersubjective level because consciousness must be
consciousness for a transcendental subject, as well as consciousness ofsome object.
Unfortunately for Husser! , the status of subjective and intersubjective phenomenology, in
terms of certainty, cannot be on par. Only subjective phenomenology can lay claim to any
certainty. At the subjective level, there is the certainty of the ego and what is immediately
present to it. The science of phenomenology builds upon this basic level of givenness.
From this starting point, claims about the essence of the ego can be made with certainty.
However, because others are not given with original self-evidence, the intersubjective
32 David Carr, "The ' Fifth Meditation ' and Husserl's Cartesiani sm," Philosophy and Phenom enological
Research 3(1) (September 1973) : 23-29 .
33 1bid., 32.
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community that is constituted along with them has no firm basis." Husserl claims that the
different streams of consciousness that are apperceived as constituting different
perspectives on the same objective world are united in the form of a communal
intentional act that constitutes an intersubjective nature. " However, in the context of
Husserl's method, it is difficult to see how this intersubjectivity can ever be anything
more than a mediate and indirect object of consciousness for the isolated transcendental
ego . Because of the uncertainty of the psychological world of others, the individual can
really only know the community as s/he constitutes it solipsistically. The ego has only its
own constitution of this community as evidence, and so the community must remain an
object." never known to be present to itself as a constituting intersubjectivity with its
own primordial sphere.
Another way of stating Husserl's unsatisfactory solution to the problem of
intersubjectivity would be to say that other subjects and the intersubjective community
are not autonomous or fundamentally distinct from the transcendental ego. For Husser!,
they are reducible to it as to a foundational unity or sameness. In the fifth meditation,
Husserl performs an epoche that limits our consideration to the ego's sphere of ownness.
This is the core of being, the source of all acts of consciousness and the basis upon which
all objects of consciousness are constructed. Even though the conscious processes of
other subjects are not directly present in the sphere of ownness, their meaning is fully
constituted on the basis of what is directly present in this sphere. By means of pairing, we
constitute certain objects as being directly controlled by conscious processes like our
34 Ibid., 34.
35 Ibid., 29-30.
36 Ibid., 33.
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own. However, it remains the case that the self maintains a logical priority over the other.
While pairing does involve reciprocity between self and other, it nonetheless favours the
self because it occurs entirely within the sphere of ownness. The other is a
"modification", a new instance, an analogue of the transcendental ego and its sphere of
ownness . The sole source of the meaning of the other is the self. As a result, otherness in
Husserl is not radically other. It is derived entirely from the unity of the self and is
reducible to this unity . Pairing cannot be said to be properly or fully reciprocal given this
priority of the self. 3?
The "authenticity of constitutive intersubjectivity" is undermined by the priority
of the self in the experience of others." Husserl needs a notion of intersubjectivity in
which meanings are constituted by the many, by a community of autonomous egos. This
is the true social ontology that Husserl is aiming for. However, the priority of the self
makes this impossible because the self is always the absolute centre of constitutional
activity, the absolute center of being. Husserl's demand that intersubjectivity operate to
construct meaning requires a more radical notion of otherness. It requires that otherness
not be reducible to the unity of an ego. As long as it is so reducible, intersubjectivity can
never achieve independence from the ego that constitutes it. As a result, we have a
homogeneous, rather than a heterogeneous, intersubjectivity. Or we could say that the
heterogeneity of inter subjectivity is reducible to the homogeneity of the transcendental
ego. Either way, Husserl's other does not contribute positively or radically enough to the
constitution of the world. Because the ground of the other is the ego, because Husserl
37 Brown, 27-29 .
38 Ibid., 28.
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gives reality to others and the objective world only by way of abstraction from what is
immediately given in the sphere of own ness, any meaning that an other does contribute is
reducible to the sphere of ownness of the ego and the sense that was transferred from
there to allow for the constitution of the other. By making the ego the foundation upon
which others and the world are constituted, Husserl makes all difference converge upon
sameness, a common feature of representational modes of thought. For Husserl, it is
epistemologically important that subjectivity maintain its unity because this provides his
inquiry with an indubitable starting-point. His theory maintains the unity of the subject by
allowing no break in the unity of intentional processes. If others were radically other such
a break in unity would occur. However, because others are analogues of the self, no break
occurs . The unity of the subject is maintained by making all otherness and differences an
aspect of the synchronous unity of the subject."
Static analysis begins with an ego whose essence is not in any way determined by
others. Because static analysis does not allow others to playa primary role in the
constitution of any particular self, the reciprocity that occurs between self and other is
categorically unbalanced. The self always has a privileged role to play in the reciprocal
constitution that occurs between self and other. Consequently, the intersubjective
community of egos is conceived as having no primary constitutive role to play in the
formation of its particular members. Even Husserl's more diachronic analyses of
intersubjectivity in The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
do not forsake the priority of the ego . While Husserl there gives more emphasis to the
intersubjective constitution of meaning, he still maintains the priority of the experience of
39 Ibid ., 29-32 .
the isolated subject. The epoche must begin, he says, from the phenomenologist's "own
vantage point": "he must begin with his original self-experience and his own original
self-consciousness, i.e., the self-apperception of himself as the man to whom he accords
whatever he does accord".4o
Husserl's philosophy is a transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense. It posits
a theory about the necessary conditions of our experience of a unified and knowable
world. Like Kant, he sees the universal subject, the transcendental ego, as that which
allows for the possibility of this experience and knowledge. Unity and structure are given
to what we perceive by virtue of the always identical ego that accompanies all our
intentional acts of consciousness. For Husserl, it is this underlying unity of being that
allows the world to be experienced and known. Differences must become subordinate to
this unity if they are to present and be representable in consciousness.
Gilles Deleuze also elaborates a transcendental philosophy, one that he calls
transcendental empiricism. He too is concerned to show how our experience of a unified
world is possible. His solution to this problem is a reversal of Husserl's. In his solution,
Deleuze elaborates a theory that gives priority to difference. Out of difference comes the
unity that we experience, and experience depends on this priority of difference. This
theory will prove to have serious consequences for the idea of epistemological certainty
and serve as an instructive stepping-stone on our way to addressing the question of how
the self and the world can be best understood as the product of collective constitution.
• 0 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Trans. David
Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) 253.
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Chapter 2:
Difference and Otherness in Deleuze
In our first chapter we explored how Husserl gives priority to unity , specifically the unity
of the self or transcendental ego, in his static analysis of the self-other relationship and
intersubjectivity. We have demonstrated that this analysis is insufficient to support the
idea that the world is intersubjectively or communally constituted. This is because the
self, as it is initially given in the primordial sphere , is not constituted or determined to any
extent by others. An other is constituted by the self as a new instance of the self. As a
result, the reciprocal constitution that occurs between self and other is inherently and
categorically lop-sided in favour of the self. Similarly, the community of egos is
conceived as having no initial role to play in the constitution of any self. The unity of the
self is conceived as prior to the constituting activity that the community exerts on the self.
The constitution of the world can therefore be traced back to the self, not to the reciprocal
relations between selves . This, we have argued, is an inadequate concept of
intersubjectivity.
In this chapter, we will employ the thought of Gilles Deleuze to attain a better
concept of inter subjectivity. We will begin by exploring how Deleuze gives priority to
difference rather than unity, and how he conceives of unities as being constructed on the
basis of difference. We will explore his critique ofHusserl's representationalism, as well
as his critique of representationalism in general. But we will also embark upon a critique
of Deleuze's preference for giving priority to difference. It will be argued that making
difference prior is tantamount to introducing a transcendent principle as a way of
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explaining the world as it is experienced. While this principle is not transcendent in the
same way as the transcendent principles of unity that Deleuze is critical of, it nonetheless
violates the principle of immanence to which Deleuze's philosophy claims to adhere. We
will argue that maintaining a philosophy of immanence requires that neither difference
nor unity be conceived as prior. Rather, they must be conceived as mutually implicating
and codependent.
In the midst of this analysis of unity and difference, what will have become of our
promise to achieve a better concept of intersubjectivity and the reciprocal relations that
constitute the world? By achieving a better understanding of the relation between unity
and difference, we hope to provide ourselves with a framework with which to understand
the self as a unity in flux whose constitution is fundamentally determined by those other
selves with which it comes into contact. The self will be conceived as having no unity
prior to these relations with others. Rather, it will be conceived as, from the start,
constituted by others and simultaneously constituting others. We will therefore have
achieved a conception of community based on the reciprocal relations between its
members.
2.1 Pure Difference
Let us begin with what Deleuze takes to be most prior: difference. At times Deleuze
speaks of differences as if they exist in isolation and separation from all possible
unification of those differences into coherent wholes. Difference conceived as such is
pure difference. Pure difference is characterized by the differences or "differential
components" that become unified into a coherent and experiencable world. Deleuze gives
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these differences various names such as "singularities", "haecceities", and "constituents".
These are his general names for the primary positive differences that subtend all
consciousness, experience, and meaning. When giving primacy to difference, these are
the "unexplained explainers" and so cannot be accounted for.'" Pure difference is
irreducible to any ultimate principle or set of unifying principles.Y and can therefore be
said to be "constitutive all the way down" for Deleuze.43 This is why Deleuze says in
Difference and Repetition that "difference is behind everything, but behind difference
there is nothing't" In other words, the notion ofa "behind difference" makes no sense for
Deleuze.
Pure differences are, for Deleuze, irresolvably different. These differences are not
imperfections that must be reconciled in identity. They are not lacking anything in being
ununified. Instead, the distance between these differences is positive distance; the
distance is purely affirrned.45 As such, positive distance is not distance that must be
overcome. Differences can be recognized as different and not made to resolve in identity.
That is why these differences are differences-in-kind, not differences of degree. The latter
are differences that are subsumed by the identities constructed out of difference. Just as a
protractor has an abstract point where all of its divisions of degrees, minutes, and seconds
converge, differences of degree are all aspects of a single abstract unity. Difference-in-
41 Todd May, "Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze," in Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre ofPhilosophy,
eds. Constantine V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski ( lew York : Routledge , 1994),46.
42 Ibid., 40.
43 Ibid., 39.
44 Gilles Deleuze , Difference and Repetition, Trans . Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994),80.
45 Gilles Deleuze, Logic ofSense, Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990), 172-173 .
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kind, however, pertains to pure difference.46 Pure differences are neither contradictory,
nor subsumed by any identity. It is a mistake to characterize them as such because pure
difference is completely unstructured.Y There is no fixed point of reference that binds
them all together. Rather than serving the purpose of an ultimate convergence and
cancellation of difference, Deleuze sees pure difference and positive distance as allowing
for the possibility of life's movement.
Deleuze believes there is something beyond experience, viz. pure difference, that
is more basic and gives rise to unity. By affirming difference in this way we penetrate to
the real, to the origin of the sense and value of abstract unities, to the force and will that
drives appearances." Pure difference is "anonymous and productive, subsisting beneath
and within the perceptible world ofidentities".49 This "pure and measureless becoming of
qualities threatens the order of qualified bodies from within".50 Out of the divergence and
incompossibility that characterizes pure difference, elements are brought together in
experience and given resonance." It is the affirmation of distance that Deleuze believes
allows for the possibility of the experienced world of changing unities. 52In this way,
Deleuze's concept of difference institutes a way of thinking which displaces the idea of
the priority of unity (representationalism) that has dominated philosophy.v'
46 Todd May, "Gilles Deleuze and the politics of time," Man and World 29 (1996) : 295.
47 Deleuze, Logic, 170.
48 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy , Trans . Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), 197.
49 Todd May, "When is a Deleuzian becoming"," Continental Philosophy Review 36 (2003): lSI.
50 Deleuze , Logic, 164.
51 Ibid., 173-174.
52 Ibid., 166.
53 May, "Difference and Unity ," 39.
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2.2 Fields ofUnity
The perceived or experienced world is composed of a selection of differences. In
experience, differences become arranged in various fields of unity, or what Deleuze and
Guattari call planes, plateaus, or surfaces. There are many such planes. What they have in
common is that each brings a unique consistency to the pure difference that underlies the
world. A plane "acts like a sieve"; it selects "a section of chaos,, 54and thereby constitutes
a perspective. 55 This is analogous to the way a Cartesian grid defines the nothingness of a
white page, or the way a city-planner arranges the streets, houses, and public spaces of a
neighbourhood. In both cases, a selection is made that brings a certain consistency to the
activities that will take place. The movements of thought and practice that will take place
are hereby set off on a particular trajectory and made to cohere with one another in a
consistent yet fluid manner.
In philosophical practice, planes of thought are laid out or traced in relation to
problems. For example, the first philosophy of Ren e Descartes sees objective certainty as
problematic.i" Empirical knowledge seems to lack a ground. Thus, Descartes, like
Husserl, seeks to establish a subjective certainty that can serv as a basis for objective
knowledge. The concept of the cogito offers a solution to this problem. It allows for the
creation of other concepts that remain consistent with it and which continue to work out a
solution to the problem of grounding empirical knowledge. The cogito and its related
concepts trace a plane of thought, a philosophical plane. This is a sectioning of pure
54Gilles Deleu ze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy ", Trans . Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell
(New York : Columbia University Press , 1994),42.
55May, "Difference and Unity ."
56Deleuze and Guattari, 26-27.
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difference , a unity constructed out of difference. As such, the cogito initiates a novel
resonance of thought, cast ing a new pitch and timbr e ove r the conceptual terrain . A new
rule of movement is institut ed. According to Del euze and Guattari, it is because
Descartes ' cogito creates a new unit y in, or brings a new harmonic resonance to, thought
that it can be considered valuable, i.e., interesting, remarkable, and important. The value
of a set of concepts and the plane they trace are, for Deleuze and Guattari, determined by
the aims of the philosopher who is engaged in the act of constructing concepts. Their
value is relative to the problems that the philosopher wishes to or must address, and to the
conceptual possibilities that his/her particular slice of pure difference opens up.
The relationship between a plane and the concepts, or collections of selected
differences, that trace it is one that should be precisel y understood. Todd May provides a
good summary of this relationship. The creation , arran gement, and rearrangement of
concepts are the act iviti es that result in the tracing ofa plane of immanence.57In creating
concepts , philosophy "either rearranges a plan e, articulates a new plane , or forces an
intersection of that plane with others ".58 Any change in the composition or arrangement
of the concepts results in a change in the overall nature of the plane . In this way, a
concept is a "productive force" in that it has effects on the entir e "conceptual field" .59
However, while a plane is the unity of the concepts that trace it, it remains distinct from
these concepts. " This is because the plane that is traced in the creation of concepts is not
reducible to those concepts. In this sense the plane is an "open whole " . It is a whole
57 May, "D ifference and Unity," 43.
58 Ibid., 36.
59 Ibid., 35-36 .
60 Ibid., 43.
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because its concepts are all related. It is open in that these concepts do not exhaust the
possibilities of that plane. It remains capable of further devel opment." It is therefore a
unity that is capable of differing. Furthermore, what gives a plane its unity is not a
principle that is beyond, or transcendent to, the plane. This is why they are called planes
of immanence.Y A plane has unity by virtue of its own consis tency, i.e. the consistency
that holds between the concepts that occupy the plane at any given time.
2.3 Transcendent Principles of Unity
Any plane gives consistency to thought by constructing unity out of a selection of
differences. However, not all philosophers are aware of the nature of the planes that they
are constructing. In this way, illusory transcendence enters into thought, for many do not
understand that pure difference lies at the root of their thinking as a "principle of genesis
or production'Y" As a result, they believe the unities or conce pts that they have
constructed are the essential foundations of the world and our experience of it. They
believe unity is fundamental, not realizing that it is a secondary phenomenon derived
from pure difference. In other words, while they are doing phi losophy creatively, they are
not aware of this. They misunderstand what they are doing, mistaking the concepts they
create for discoveries of the fundamental and eternal unities that ground reality, unities
that are transcendent to all possible planes. To make such a mistake is to remain at the
level of consciousness where only the effects or symptoms of pure difference are
6 1 Ibid ., 36.
62 Ibid .
630 eleuze, Nietzsclze, 157.
apparent." To affirm pure difference, or the unconscious, is to affirm the cause that gives
rise to experience and its various changeable unities. Attaining the unconscious means
shattering the illusion that unity is the most basic feature of reality. 65
Deleuze and Guattari identify three types of illusory transcendence that have
dominated the history of west em philosophy. One of these is the illusion of
"contemplation" or "objective idealism".66 Platonism is subject to this type of illusion.
According to such thinking, the immanent world - or world of appearances, flux, and
creation, i.e. the world unified in accordance with planes of immanence - is conceived as
immanent to a transcendent world of eternal Ideas, Objects, or Essences. According to
Deleuze and Guattari, this notion is illusory because it locates concepts that were created
in immanence - such as the ideas of justice, temperance, and the good - outside of
immanence, thereby artificially isolating them from thought's creative movements. The
Ideas, or transcendent figures of Truth, are thought of as pre-existing or uncreated
objectalities. " principles of structure that are beyond all planes of immanence. In this
way, contingently created concepts are mistakenly elevated to the level of universal
necessities.68 At the same time, these concepts are conceived as governing or limiting the
creative processes that take place in thought and practice. For Platonists, the Ideas are
64 Gilles Deleuze , Spinoza : Practical Philosophy , Trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books ,
1988),19.
65 The Freudian unconscious posits or theorizes a fixed structure in the human psyche that determines the
conscious operations of the psyche in a uniform and predictable fashion that is not fundamentally altered by
material or environmental factors . In contrast to this , the Dele uzian/Guattarianunconsciousisanon-
structure or non-order that is the prior condition for the structurat ion of conscious experience. This latter
conception of the unconscious is the principle of the production and reformation of the order of conscious
experience. It does not anchor experienced unities, as does the Freudian unconscious, but allows for and
accounts for the movement and transformation of these unities .
66 Deleu ze and Guattari, 6-7 .
67 Ibid ., 29.
68 Ibid ., 44-45
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models or pure qualities that sensible things only imperfectly imitate or represent.
Similarly, our thoughts are true or well formed to the extent that they accurately represent
the purity of these etemal forms . In this way, creativity is stifled and those who inhabit
the world offlux are seemingly made passive and oppressed in relation to the
transcendent power of the Ideas.
A second illusion, that of "reflection" or "subjective idealism'V" entails making
planes of immanence, or what can also be called here fields of consciousness or
determined and particular acts of thought, immanent to an undetermined and uncreated,
universal and necessary subject. According to this model, all immanent creative acts of
consciousness are governed by the necessary structure of this subject. Immanuel Kant's
concept of the subject, depicted by Deleuze and Guattari as a bull-headed machine, is one
example of this type of illusion . Similar to the Ideas of Platonism, this subject is a concept
created in immanence or in consciousness and is therefore wrongly conceived as the
being in which consciousness is centred ." In this case, justifying knowledge entails
knowing the a priori structure of this subject, or the way that it gives a necessary structure
to the flux of sensible data. Here we see our freedom of thought being limited in a manner
that is similar to the way in which Plato's Ideas bound the immanent movements of
thought.
A third illusion, that of "communication" or "intersubjective idealism", comes
about when transcendence is seen as emerging from within the immanent field of
consciousness. Husserl, like Kant, posits the concept of the universal subject as the
69 Ibid., 6-7.
70 Ibid., 46
necessary ground of reality. Husserl attempts to move beyond the isolation entailed by the
grounding of reality in the self by showing how the objective world is actually constituted
intersubjectively. As we have demonstrated, Husserl does not fully succeed in justifying
the intuition that objective meanings are constituted intersubjectively. Therefore, the flux
of creative immanence must remain immanent to a subject with a supposedly necessary
manner of constituting meaning. The upshot ofHusserl's approach is that while he tries to
shatter the isolation that results when experience is conceived as grounded on the
intentional processes of a transcendental subject, he does not do this in a convincing
manner because the intersubjective community is constituted as an analogue or
representation of the original subjectivity.
I would guess that Deleuze and Guattari call the transcendence ofHusserl's
thought "iutersubjective idealism" because he attempts to establish as a basis for the
apodictic grounding of the sciences the agreeable or identical ways in which all subjects
constitute the objective world. For Husserl, having properly justified knowledge means
that one's objects of consciousness must be conceived as intersubjectively constituted, i.e.
subsumable within a unity that encompasses all transcendental subjects, and not
constituted merely by a single isolated subject. For Deleuze and Guattari, this ultimately
means that consensus, arrived at by means of "communication", is the mark of truth. Ifall
subjects can agree that they have constituted identical meanings in their consciousnesses,
then it is safe to say that these meanings are universally true. However, Deleuze and
Guattari do not believe that concepts are created through communication, discussion, and
consensus building. What happens instead is a subordination of many differing
perspectives to one that prevails as the most popular. Discussion leads to a lessening of
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difference through the est ablishment ofa universal cons ensus , i.e. through the
subordination and subsumption of difference in unit y. As such, it misunderstands the real
problem or challenge of thou ght , for it belie ves that thou ght must find peace in
universals." For Del euze and Guattari , thought is strife and philosophy ought to promote
the proliferation of differences through the creation of conc epts and tracing of planes.
Concepts and planes should not represent an already existing opinion, but a new direction
for thought, practice, and life.
These three "idealisms" employ representationalist models of thought. "The
primacy of identity," says Deleu ze, " ... defines the world of representation'tf In
representation, all immanent perspectives converge on a unit y, and each perspective is a
property, or representation, of this unity . As Deleu ze says, repr esentational thinking
"maintains a unique cent er which gathers and represents all the others ". 73Differences are
"e ither reduced, mar ginali zed, or denied altogether" by dominating identity" On such a
view, transcendent conc epts provide the necessary forms of experience, while the sensible
is merel y the variable content of the forms . By virtue of such concepts, experiences are
equivalent and repeatable because they have the sam e "organizational form" ." The
"actual (here and now) sensations" that instantiate a concept are devalued because at
another time other sensations could provide content that would produce an equivalent
representation and therefore equivalent knowledge. i" This reduces the sensible to
71 Ibid., 82 .
72Deleuze, DijJerellce, ix.
73 Ibid., 56 .
74 May , "Differe nce and Unity," 45 .
75 Bruce Baugh, "Tra nsce nden tal Empi ricism : Dele uze's Respo nse to Hegel," Mall and World 25 (199 2):
134.
76 Ibid.
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difference which is said of the identical. " Any sensible particularities that are not
accounted for by the concept are "accidental or extrinsic 't " If this is the nature of
thought, then transcendent principles of unity explain the sensible and how it is raised to
the level ofknowledge.79
As we have already shown, Deleuze and Guattari find fault with Husserl because
he is ultimately concerned with giving priority to a representational mode of thought. In
their own philosophies, Deleuze and Guattari deny the primacy of representational
thinking . They are critical of this image of thought, which understands both thought and
the world as ordered by a priori forms of possibility that govern how we experience the
world. For representationalism, it is the existence of transcendent structures that is
problematic for thought. These structures are conceived as independent of thought's
immanent movement and therefore unaffected by its movement. For representationalism,
it is philosophy's job to discover or represent these transcendent unities.
Deleuze and Guattari think it is misleading to conceive of philosophy in this way.
They make it their task to institute a way of thinking philosophy that gives order,
consistency, and continuity to thought while at the same tim allowing it to move and
create .i" free from the governing influence of transcendent unities . They conceive
philosophical thinking not as representational, but as creative in response to problems that
are immanent to it,SI problems that are determined by the movement of thought. As such,
the discipline of philosophy does not seek knowledge of what already is, but instead
77 Oeleuze, Differenc e, 57.
78 Baugh, 134.
79 Ibid.
80 Oeleuze and Guattari, 42 &47.
8\ Paul Patton , "Concept and Event, " Mall and World 29 (1996) : 3 I7.
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undertakes the task of fashioning novel concepts that are primarily self-referential.
Philosophical concepts are therefore not uncreated. The concepts we use need not already
exist. Rather, they can be unique and novel "singularities" because concepts are open
unities formed out of a selection of differences. Thus conceived, the value of
philosophical thinking lies in its capacity to invent new ways of thinking and living. For
Deleuze, a philosophy ought to engage the world in a creative manner, giving us tools
that enable us to refashion it.s2 Concepts are thus an investment in the future in that they
can determine what the world will be like by inspiring us to live differently.
Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophy seeks a middle way between
representationalism, which posits haltings in, or barriers to, the movement of thought
such that it becomes static and rigid, and the extreme disorder of chaos, where
determinations in thought appear and disappear simultaneously so that there is no
continuity between them. s3 Any ultimate resting place for thought is, for Deleuze and
Guattari, an illusion. This is not to say that unities are not necessary for there to be
experience. They are necessary. It is not unities per se that prevent the creation of
concepts, but only unities which posit a certain structure as necessary and which claim
that a certain perspective is "unsurpassable't." The main upshot of Deleuze's and
Guattari's approach is that we should not cling to any constructed unities as if they are
necessary. Giving priority to difference does not get rid of unities altogether, but only
82 Ibid., 325 .
83 Deleuze and Guattari , 42 . The idea of chaos is synonymous with pure difference for Deleuze . There may
be some doubt as to whether those terms are equivalent, since true chaos would preclude the idea of any
distinct determinations, no matter how unstructured and random their relations with one another. I will seek
in this paper to dispose of any need to appeal to either chaos orpure difference inanimmanentaccountof
experience.
84 May, "Difference and Unity," 40.
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those uni fying principles "that either preclude difference or relegate it to a negative
phenom enon".85 For Deleu ze, all uniti es are in flux and so unit y must be understood as
being related to differ ence as a prior condition if we are to understand the nature of reality
and exper ience.
2.4 Tran sce ndence and Pure Difference
Given that Deleu ze posits pure difference as the necessary condition for the phenomenon
of unity a nd the creation of concepts, it is pertinent to ask whether in doing so he is
positing a n ultimate transcendent principle that eternally and necessarily conditions our
experienc e. In a sense he is, for, as Michael Hardt says , Deleuze is not an anti -
foundationalist.86 But he argues for a different kind of foundation, one that does not
condition the world in the same way traditional forms of transcendence do . This is the
case for a number of reasons.
F irstl y, whereas the types of transcendental representation that Deleuze finds fault
with are haracteri zed by oneness , unit y, and structure, pure difference is completely
unstruct ured . It therefore invol ves no "transcendental fixity" 87for it imparts no necessary
form to t.Iie structured world of appearances. This, however, is exactly the function of
tradition al forms of transcendence. It is this feature that leads them to theoretically limit
the poss i b ilities of creation. Thought becomes focused on the attainment of and
conform - ty with these forms . It becomes focused on the goal of achieving an adequate
:: Ibid.
Michae l Hardt, Gilles Deleuze : All Apprentices hip ill Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
~r~~~d . ~:~~!' xv.
and consistent representation of these fonns to the exclusion of many other possible ways
of thinking. Pure difference, on the other hand, while it gives rise to structure and unity, is
not itself an underlying unity . It is that out of which all unity and structure is created, and
theoretically no structure that arises from it is necessary. As such, pure difference values
contingency and anomalies. Transcendental representation devalues contingency. It posits
an underlying necessity that constrains the world. It must then confront the paradox that
much of what we experience is not in conformity with the underlying ideal form . The
thoughts of a madman and the ways he gives unity and meaning to his experience, for
example, cannot be understood in their own right if we require his thoughts to either
conform to our notions of sane thinking and common sense, or else be relegated to the
class of anomalous accidents that are simply not worthy of consideration in our attempts
to understand the world as it is. For those who subscribe to representationalism, the
discrepancy between what we expect from the world, based on a preconceived notion of
its underlying unity, and what we actually find in the world, leads to the view that the
world is lacking something. Then there arises the imperative to make the world conform
to the posited foundation. But if we take the view that there i~ no ideal structure to the
world, then the world lacks nothing in not conforming to our concepts. The only lack can
be the misunderstandings that arise when we take certain structures as necessary, or
construct concepts while believing that we are actually discovering something eternally
necessary. Positing pure difference eliminates the confusions that result from
transcendental representationalism. We need not be confused that the world as we
experience it does not conform to our concepts, for we realize that our concepts do not
provide or represent the foundations of the world. According to Deleuze's transcendental
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empiricism, there are many possible ways of giving order to the world because order is
derivative. It arises from pure difference, from non-order. Pure difference offers us an
explanation of the phenomenon of unity, rather than leaving it unexplained and using it to
explain the phenomena of experience. It explains the occurrence of 'universals'. For
Deleuze and Guattari, "[t]he first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain
nothing but must themselves be explained'V"
A second reason why pure difference is not a form of transcendental
representationalism is that traditional forms of transcendence are posited as knowable
entities or structures. These are principles that are at least hypothetically thinkable. They
must be if they are to be discoverable. Pure difference, however, is beyond thought.
Thought depends on this reserve of potential relations, but all thinking must be done in
accordance with some form of contingent structure that has been constituted from pure
difference because unstructured thought would be complete nonsense. No particular
created structure is necessary, but some kind of structure is necessary for thinking to
occur. Here we see that pure difference is not a knowable fact. Rather, it is a useful
positing, a belief that is believable because it allows us to make sense of the world as we
perceive it. It is an hypothesis that helps explain what we experience. Our experience is
characterized by various unities that change their form through time. Both unity and
difference are evident in the world. Traditionally, unity has been favoured as an
underlying principle. Deleuze hypothesizes that difference is that which lies behind
appearances because this idea has greater explanatory power than any transcendent
principle of unity. Instead of being frustrated by the discrepancy between our concepts,
88 Oeleuzeand Guattari, 7.
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i.e. our unities, and the various ways in which the world contradicts these, we can see our
concepts as contingent yet powerful constructions that contribute to the possibilities of
this world .
So because pure difference differs from transcendent principles of unity in that it
is non-structure and hence unthinkable, we can safely say that pure difference is not a
kind of transcendental representationalism. However, there is good reason to suspect that
there is an element of transcendence involved in the idea of pure difference. As we have
said, pure difference is not a "traditional" form of transcendence, i.e. representationalism.
But it is for Deleuze the most prior condition of the world as it appears. Deleuze's
empiricism provides us with a theory of the conditions that make experience possible.
This is why it is a transcendental empiricism.
Ifwe are to say that pure difference is transcendent then we ought to be clear
about what we mean when we say "transcendent". When designating certain principles of
unity as transcendent we signify that these principles are both foundational in relation to
the world as it appears and also in themselves unexperiencable in as far as these
principles are not corporeal. Transcendent principles of unity claim to provide only the
form of all corporeal experience. Actual experience cannot be merely an empty form. All
experience involves some measure of corporeality. Now if we say that pure difference is
transcendent, then what we seem to mean is that it is a condition of possibility for the
world as it appears and that it is beyond experience. Deleuze would agree with our first
statement, that pure difference is a prior condition for experience, but he would disagree
with the statement that pure difference is beyond experience. In Difference and
Repetition, for example, Deleuze suggests that pure difference is directly experiencable.
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He says there that affirming the difference below repr esentation means that we enter the
domain of "'experience', transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible".89 A bit
later he states that transcendental empiricism involves
apprehend[ing] directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the
very being ofthe sensible : difference, potential difference and difference in
intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. i"
Here he plainly asserts that pure difference, the most prior condition of experience, is
sensible and can be apprehended in experience.
It is important for Deleuze to argue that pure difference is directly experiencable
because otherwise his philosophy of pure immanence is compromised. Designating pure
difference as a transcendental principle by virtue of its metaphysical priority is relatively
safe since the function of its priority is not to impart any necessary structure to that which
appears in the world. In this respect, it is quite opposed to the kind of priority assumed by
transcendental principles of unity. But ifpure difference is transcendental in that it is
beyond experience, and even beyond all possible experience, then it is the case that the
conditions of experience are not apparent in, or immanent to, experience. Consequently,
Deleuze's philosophy could no longer be called a philosophy of pure immanence.
In what follows, I will argue that a consistent philosophy of immanence can be
elaborated more effectively without positing pure difference as the a priori condition of
experience. I will accomplish this partly by way of an explication of a general Deleuzian
theory of the self-other relation. This will show that while differences are apparent in
experience, pure difference is not. In experience, differences are unified, and these unities
890 eleuze, Differenc e, 56.
90 Ibid., 56-57.
composed of differences undergo processes of differing. That is, they are in flux . Thus, in
experience there is a codependency of unity and difference. Unity differs across its
variously connected fields , and differences are unified in these fields. Pure difference is
itself an idea that is transcendent to these fields and is therefore not a feature of
experience. Fields or planes are characterized by unified differences, not pure difference.
The planes might be said to imply the notion of pure difference, but this is an idea that
transcends our empirical capacities.
In addition to correcting Deleuze 's philosophy of immanence, we will also be
furnished with an account of the self-other relation that gives others primary constitutive
power in relation to the self and therefore allows for the world to be conceived as
constituted by the reciprocal relations between its parts.
2.5 Deleuzian Concepts
To begin the next section of this thesis, I will say a bit more about Deleuze's and
Guattari's theory of concepts. This theory will prove to be helpful in our attempt to
formulate a Deleuzian model of the self-other relation becau~e, like selves, concepts are
unities in flux. They are unities that undergo processes of differing.
In What is Philosophy ? Deleuze and Guattari elaborate a theory of concepts. Here,
concepts are characterized as distinct territories, or regions of activity and power, where
selected differences, or what can also be called singularities, have been gathered to
compose higher singularities or "events". Concepts are events or territories of thought:
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"[tjhe concept speaks the event".9J So when we speak of the features and structure of
concepts, we are also speaking of the features and structure of events, singularities, or
territories of thought.
Concepts are never simple. They are each a "combination [chif.Tre]"92 composed of
a multiplicity of components, which are themselves concepts composed of components.
Although a concept's components are distinct and heterogeneous, they are made
inseparable, or homogeneous, within the concept. This is the "endoconsistency" of the
concept." What holds the various components together and unites them in the form of a
singular concept is a certain harmony or resonance which renders the components
partially indiscernible and thus inseparable from a certain creative point of view, or
according to a certain "taste".94A concept as a whole is the "point of coincidence,
condensation, or accumulation of its own cornponents'Y" it is apprehended all at once as
a unity with a singular vibration or "intension".96The conceptual point is a quality or
intension that runs constantly throughout the components, while the components are
intensive features or intensive ordinates of this overall quality.
Deleuze and Guattari offer us the example of the concept of a bird. To grasp and
understand this concept one need not look to a higher class to which it belongs, such as
animal, flying thing, or sacred /poetical motif. Instead, one need only look to its singular
components, "its postures, colours, and songs", and feel or intuit the indiscernibility or
9 1 Deleuze and Guattari , 21 .
92 Ibid ., 15.
:: Ibid ., 19.
IbId., 77.
95 Ibid. , 20
96 Ibid .
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harmony that unites them into one "syneidetic" entity;" one synthesis of component
senses, a single qualitative entity synthesized from the components' qualities, a
"refrain".98To have a concept in this way is to perform an "act of thought" that surveys
the components and immediately grasps their unity." In surveying its components, the
concept-intension courses through them . This is a survey without distance in the sense
that the concept-intension is "immediately co-present to all its components or
variations". ' 00 This immediacy is what makes conceiving a concept infinitely speedy and
non-discursive. The grasping of the concept is not a process of deduction, but an intuition,
or instantaneous survey, which holds the components together. Unlike discursive
propositions, concepts do not refer to any concrete or extensional states of affairs.
Concepts are uniquely constituted unities, and therefore self-referential or "self-positing";
the only object of the act of intuiting or creating a concept is "the inseparability of the
components that constitute its consistency't.!" The concept need not refer to anything
other than itself.
However, the components of a concept or territory are not eternally inseparable.
Rather, they are inseparable only at the moment of the intuiting ofa concept as a singular
accumulation. All concepts and territories are in flux. Component singularities are lost
and gained in processes of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari use two words to name this
process of the exchange of singularities: deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The
former designates the instability or "virtuality" of a territory, the openness of its limits or
97 Ibid .
98 Ibid. , 21.
99 Ibid .
100 Ibid .
101 Ibid ., 22-23 .
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boundaries so that it is capable of becoming other, of taking on new component
singularities. Reterritorialization names the relative stability or "actuality" of a territory.
A territory has stability because all its determinations are not brought in and expelled
from it simultaneously. In other words, there is a relative continuity of singularities in that
all the singularities of a territory will not be replaced all at once. There is no absolute
continuity because a territory has no eternal or necessary components. Relative
continuity, or consistency, is what differentiates a territory from pure difference.
2.6 Deleuzian Selfhood and Otherness
We may take a concept's survey as a model or analogue of what it is to be a self, for a self
can also be characterized as a territory or event, a unity constructed out of difference. As
Deleuze and Guattari say, all concepts are multiplicities, but not all multiplicities are
conceptual. '02 Just as the concept's survey, or overall intension, is not located in a
dimension that is supplementary to its components, we might say that a self is not in a
separate dimension than its components. A self is, rather, a quality or intension that
suffuses the features of its field or territory. Thus, the "I" is a! no distance from its field. It
is the field in as far as it is indiscernible from it. The "I" is the inseparability of what is in
the field, just as the concept is the inseparability of its components and is at no distance
from them .l'"
Thus, we have a characterization ofa selfas singularity or event. A selfis a
gathering-in of differences, of the components that for a time make it what it is. Other
102 Ibid ., 15.
103 Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, "Translator' s Introduction," What is Philosophy", by Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): ix-x,
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persons are immediate components ofa selfin as far as a self takes in or contemplates
others in its interactions with them . A self, as a territory or selection of differences, has a
quality or resonance that surveys, or suffuses, it. An other, as a component event, is a
modulation of this resonance, a counterpoint that changes the quality of a self as a
whole .104
To encompass an other within one's survey is to habituate oneself to this other as
a component. A self habitually contracts or takes in the elements of which it is composed.
A plant composes itself similarly, but according to its own specific capacities. It contracts
water, earth, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates to make itself a plant. IDSAnother
person is contracted into the survey of a self in an analogous manner. What is contracted
does not remain separate from that which contracts. David Hume's example of two men
rowing a boat, who are really one existing in a state of mutual contraction, is fitted for our
purpose .106 Each becomes the other in an on-going act of mutual creation. They are
propelled along a common trajectory by the work they do in tandem. The self in-habits
the other, just as the other inhabits, or occupies the territory of, the self.
For Deleuze and Guattari then, "I is a habit", "a habit acquired by contemplating
the elements from which we come".107 Habit is the survey that continuously holds
components together, continuously contracts components of difference. Habits change,
different components are picked up and let go, and the self changes coextensively. As
104 Deleuze 's category of the other is not limited, as it is for Husserl , to other subjects whose mental
processes are analogou s to one's own. Anything can be other for Deleuze : trees, rocks, birds, rain, women,
and men. All these others playa part in the becoming of any self . For the purpose of this paper, I will place
emphasis on the role that other persons play in the constitution and becoming of a self .
105 Deleuze and Guattari , 105.
106 David Hurne, A Treatis e 011 Human Nature (Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1978),490.
107 Deleuze and Guattar i, 105.
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individuals we are ever-changing conventions.l '" convocations, or gatherings-in. This
shows why Deleuze and Guattari call "English philosophy", or empiricism, a "free and
wild creation of concepts", 109 for this way of thinking emphasizes a continuous changing
of conventions and habits, and therefore a continuous reformation of all unities, including
concepts . In empiricism the self is not distinguishable from the singularities it contracts or
contemplates. For it, the subject is "the habit of saying I" in the midst of perpetual flUX . I IO
Empiricism emphasizes not an abstract universal subject, but events as singular
proliferations in a field.
Deleuze and Guattari displace the abstract subject through the notion of the "there
is" . The "there is" replaces the absolute "I", or transcendental subject, which was
supposed necessary by Husserl to give unity to the world. It is a conception ofselfhood
that indicates the de-centering of the self and its dispersal throughout a territory that
includes other things and other persons as components. For example, there is water to
drink, there is sunlight, there is an other who feeds, an other who threatens me, etc.
In an essay entitled "Michel Toumier and the World Without Others", Deleuze
accounts for the possibility of the movement or becoming-other of a self by what he calls
the a priori Other , or Other-structure. Actually present other persons are the variable
content of this a priori condition of perception. They are living expressions of possible
worlds, of differences yet to be actualized in the territory of a self. III As such, others are
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 48.
111 Deleuze ,Logic, 307.
conceived as mediators between the perceptible and the imperceptible, between different
immanent fields of unity.
For those familiar with zo" century French philosophy, Deleuze's
experimentation with the concept of an a priori Other in the essay on Michel Tournier
cannot help but bring to mind the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. In Levinas's version
of phenomenology, the other is closely tied to a notion of metaphysical priority.
Therefore, a brief look at some of the general themes of Levinas's thought may
illuminate, by comparison, what is accomplished or made possible by Deleuze's concept
of the a priori Other.
2.7 Levinass Concept ofthe Other
Levinas offers us an early attempt at a critique of Husserl's phenomenology and the
priority it assigns to the unity associated with the constituting activity of the
transcendental ego. To a great extent, Levinas accepts the validity ofHusserl's
descriptions of intentional consciousness. As far as he is concerned, these accurately
account for the foundations and procedures that give us knowledge of a unified world of
being. But Levinas also thinks that Husserl's account of consciousness is incomplete.
There is an aspect of consciousness, he argues, which coexists with intentional
consciousness and which is fundamental to what we are. Levinas calls this
'nonintentional consciousness' and argues that it is coextensive with our experience of
other persons.
In his philosophy, Levinas maintains that our experience of others, an experience
in which we playa passive role, introduces into consciousness an experience of difference
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that cannot be subsumed by the synchronous unity that is constituted by the
transcendental ego as its knowledge of the world . Through our experience of others we
have what he calls a "metaphysical" experience of infinity, the significance of which is
eminently ethical. This experience puts our "ontological" being into question by
immediately showing to us the manner in which our existence necessarily does violence
to others. This awareness of unsubsumable difference is in some way prior to, is
somehow a condition for, the activity of intentional consciousness, which gives us a
unified and knowing self, as well as a unified and knowable world. For Levinas, ethics
and metaphysical difference is the a priori condition for epistemology and ontology.
Levinas characterizes Husserl's epistemological phenomenology as follows.
Husserl is in agreement with the main current of philosophy's tradition in that for him
what is meaningful and characterizes the mind is the "psyche qua knowledge".112 All that
is in the psyche - that is, all that is sensed, contemplated, willed, perceived, understood,
reflected upon - is an object of knowledge. I 13 In other words, knowing is the dominant
mode of consciousness for Husserl. Knowing thought looks toward the thinkable, toward
beings or the objects of thought, which are the correlates ofI:!usserl's cogito (I think).
The world is a harmony or correlation between thought and the thinkable. For Husserl,
this is the grounding correlation. The empty intentionality of thought fulfills itselfin
grasping objects as knowledge. 114 It looks toward what is other and makes otherness a
part of the selfin the act of knowing. It makes objects, including others, part of
112 Emmanuel Levina s, "Nonintentional Consciousness," in Entre Nalls: Thinking ofthe Other, trans .
Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Pres s, 1998), 124.
113 1bid 124-5
11' lbid:: 126. .
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imm anence. liS In this way, the "I think " is determined by its objects' !" and what is
indeterminate is transformed into determinate or fonn al know ledge by being brought
within the unit y of the " I think". What is in time and dispersed becomes knowledge by
being made present to the "I think" and by being re-presented through memory. 117 In
Husserl's philosophy, thought as learning means taking, sei zin g, possessing, making
present to mind , i.e. to the self. This making immanent of what is transcendent means
thought is self-sufficient. I 18
Levinas also believes that non-theoretical intentionality, i.e. nonintentional
consciousness, is present in Husserl 's thought, although it is not at the core of his
philosophy'! " or developed as fully as it could be . Th e mov ement to transcendental life in
Huss erl's phenomenology by way of the epoch e reveal s to us t h is
nonintent iona l consciousness, says Lev i na s . For Husserl , the epoch e promises
to reveal the certainty of the unities that constitute the world . Only inadequate evidence
of the certainty of these unities is found in natural consciousness. Original evidence is
sought in transcendental consciousness so that the certainty of these unities can be judged.
In this resp ect, Huss erl 's inquiry rem ains within the bounds fknowIedge and being .12o
Husserl 's "hori zons of meaning" are equal to being. Intentional analysis reveals the
horizons of meaning and rediscovers what of being has been forgotten.V' For Husserl , the
115 Ibid. , 125.
116 Ibid .
117 Ibid.
118 1bid 125-6
119 Ibid:: 124..
120 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and Awake ning," in Who COlliesAfte r the Subject?, eds. Eduardo
Cadava, Peter Co nor, and Jean-Lu c ancy (Ne w York: Routl edge, 1991),21 I.
121 Levinas, "Non intentional," 123.
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epoche is always a matter of attaining more perfect knowledge. The awakenings that his
philosophy brings about are intended to be awakenings of knowledge.122
But as far as Levinas is concerned, epoch s does not complete the incompletion of
our knowledge of the world . That is, full certainty is not attained. Nonetheless, because it
"recognizes and measures this failure adequately" it can be called apodictic .V'' Therefore,
a kind of complete knowledge is attained through the epoch e, a knowledge that is both
"knowledge of knowledge [of what has been forgotten of being] and nonknowledge [of
the "life" that transcends being and is its condition of possibilityj't.V"
So for Levinas, there is more to Husserl's thought than he himself realized. There
is more there than the bringing together of moments of experience through a "stable rule"
of unification that gives us knowledge of the world. 125 According to Levinas, the
phenomenological reduction can bring us back to what he calls "life", "to a psychism
other than that of the knowledge of the world" .126 The reduction can be a "permanent
revolution" that reactivates and strengthens life, despite the fact that being protests
against this. 127 Husserl fails to find original evidence and adequate knowledge .
Nonetheless, a realm of meaning that is beyond being is discovered that has consequences
for being. 128 This realm offers "a critique of knowledge as knowledge", 129 a critique of
the science of the world that goes beyond the world.
: ~~ ~~i~~sl;~~.wakening," 214.
1 2~ Ibid., 212.
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The face of the other also offers us access to the lived that is beyond the wor!d. As
we have seen, Husser! gives great attention to the significance of the other. But for
Levinas, theoretical intentionality is not involved in the relation with the other, as it had
been in Husser! ' s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. l" For Levinas, intersubjective
reduction does more than address the problem of solipsism and the relativity of truth that
it entails. It is eminently significant for Levinas that the other tears the self from its
privileged position as the only "here", the absolute centre of being. The ultimate meaning
of the selfis thereby revealed. l" As we have seen , for Husser! the constitution of the
meaning of the other as another selfleads to the reconstitution of the meaning of oneself.
The "here" and "there" are inverted. The self becomes a there in relation to others . For
Levinas, the significance of the constitution of the other is not that it is a movement away
from the foundations of being (i.e. the sphere of ownness), as it had been for Husser!, but
that it is an unveiling of what is most prior: the relation to the other and the responsibility
it entails. The self's loss of primacy is its awakening from egoism. 132 Inbeing ousted
from one's privileged position as the absolute center of being, one is then exposed to the
other and has "accounts to render". 133 The other is not absorbed in the same. Nor can the
same escape the other. The closed unity of the selfis cracked because the other introduces
"the very event of transcendence as life", 134 a force greater than the activity of the self in
being and which cannot be encompassed by the unity of being. Through the other there is
130 Levinas ," Ionintentional," 124.
131 Levinas, "Awakening," 213 .
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 214.
an "excessiveness" of life, an "uncontainable" that ruptures the contained.l " The lived is
a transcendence in immanence, "a difference at the heart of intimacy" that cannot be
assimilated. 136
Levinas characterizes intentional consciousness as active and voluntary.
Consciousness acts through intentionality to constitute objects and its own synchronous
unity .137Intentional consciousness actively intervenes in being. In doing so, it expresses
its conatus, its active desire to sustain its existence.l " Our passive relation to others calls
this activity of consciousness, its striving and desire to persevere in being, into question,
says Levinas.l " Onto logically, that is in terms of one's ego and its constituting activity,
we have what Levinas calls a good conscience of being. We feel an inherent right to live
and persevere in being. Death imposes an unavoidable limit on this right, but it does not
fundamentally call into question our inalienable right to persevere in being, to strive to
continue existing. 140 This good conscience of being is called into question by our
experience of others.
Our experience of others is therefore the basis of what Levinas calls "bad
conscience". This is not the anxiety caused by the finitude of existence. 14 1 Bad conscience
is the putting into question of one's right to be out of fear for the other person's
precarious existence. This fear for the other cannot be avoided because one's being, one's
presence in the world, inherently oppresses others in that one occupies the places and
135 Ibid ., 215 .
136 Ibid. , 212-3.
137 Levinas , "N onintentional," 127.
I38 Ibid.
139 Nonintentional consciousness does not act, but is characteri zed by passivity . The "lived " that is accessed
through nonintentional consciousness is without having chose ntobe(Levinas, "Nonintentional," 128-9) .
140 Levinas , "Nonintentional," 130.
14 1 Ibid .
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resources that could very well belong to others. In this way, one's being causes
unintentional violence. We fear this violence, argues Levinas, even though we
simultaneously feel justi tied in being. 142 This fear comes over us when we encounter the
face of the other. The face ruptures the unity of our experience and being. The other's
inherent defenselessness and exposure to death puts one's being into question and makes
one responsible and fearful for their death. 143 The implicit awareness of bad conscience
makes the self that acts in the world and in being ambiguous and enigmatic in that it
recognizes itself as somewhat "hateful" in its very identity.l'" Also implied in one's
identity and freedom is humility, a questioning of the affirmation of being. 145 Because of
the hateful self, the self is no longer sovereign, 146 no longer autonomous. It is forced to
take account of the other, to address the question that the other puts to it. According to
Levinas, to address the questioning of one's right to be one must say "1".147 The other
thereby calls forth and summons one's identity. The other is a condition of the possibility
of egohood. But even after one attains being in this way, the question remains
perpetually. One's right to be is continually called into question in what we might call a
dialectic without sublation. So the self remains perpetually hateful. 148 The other at once
makes identity possible, and calls identity into question.
142 Ibid .
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In Levinas' thought, "[t]he alternative of being and nothingness is not the
ultimate".149"To be or not to be?" is not the basic question for Levinas because there is a
more fundamental aspect of consciousness: our exposure to the other who both makes
being possible and caIIs being into question. Being is secured in the passive relation to the
other. lso In recognizing non intentional consciousness and bad conscience, we see the
"possibility of fearing injustice more than death, of preferring injustice undergone to
injustice comrnittedv.P'
Levinas critici zes those who believe that the lived is a confused representation,
something that can be made into explicit knowledge through reflective consciousness,
which would intend the lived (or act upon it), thereby making it clear and distinct. 152 But
spontaneous lived consciousness would be modified ifit were to become an object of
reflection. Its meaning is misconstrued when an attempt is made to subsume it within the
realm of the same . For Levinas, the true meaning of the lived can be rendered only in
isolation from reflectivelintentional consciousness.P:' The lived is therefore not
prereflexive. It is not a "momentary weakening" or a "childhood of the mind" that can be
obliterated through intentional development that would favour the I and its "right to
be".ls4 The lived is intrinsicaIIy nonreflexive, inaccessible to reflective consciousness.
The lived is inherently inexpressible, inexplicit, and confused in terms of knowing
consciousness. It does not and cannot appear in the world as a phenomenon. I SS Being
149 Ibid., 132.
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divorced from identity and the same, it has no name and no predicates. But if we are to
speak of it we must use language, and language must employ names and predicates.
Therefore to speak of the lived is to necessarily employ metaphor.l"
To say , as Levinas does, that the lived is a "presence that fears presence,,157 is to
use the language of identity and presence to speak of that which is beyond presence and
identity . Thus, the most paradoxical of statements are amenable to it, such as: it is naked,
but not an exposed truth .158The lived is therefore not signified in language in the same
way that the objects of the world are signified. The lived is signified only in a
metaphorical sense. At the same time, this special sort of signification is the prior
condition that makes possible the linguistic systems that are used to signify the objects of
intentional consciousness. 159 The life that underlies and accompanies the objective world
is therefore radically heterogeneous with the objective world . This life is implied in
knowledge, but it is not an "interior" experience which contrasts with the "exterior"
experience of the world .l'" It is not an experience at all in as far as experience pertains to
our relation to the world . It is not an object that can be acted upon or grasped by
consciousness.l'" The lived of non intentional consciousness i.s superlatively transcendent,
a beyond-being that is also uniquely intimate. 162
156 Jacques Derrida , "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas ," in
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Ultimately, the significance of lived nonintentional consciousness for Levinas is
its challenge to the arrogance of the thought of the same. This thought displays a
"drowsiness" and "self-complacency" that resists the challenge posed by transcendence.
The identity of the same is a false repose, a false fulfillment that is a "petrification" and
"laziness".163 It is possible for "clear and distinct good conscience", i.e. intentionality, to
go about constituting objective meaning while ignoring or obscuring the passivity that
underlies it. But if it does so it goes about its activities as if sleepwalking, ignorantly and
naively.1M The experience of the other frees the self from itself, awakens it from its
"dogmatic slumber".1 65 The other involves an awakening, a sobering-up to the larger
context of our lives . But it does not destroy or replace consciousness of the same.i'"
Intentional consciousness is left intact to coexist with nonintentional consciousness.
2.8 Deleuzian Concepts ofSelfand Other Revisited
ow that we have some understanding of the significance of the concept of the other in
Levinas 's thought, and especially of the manner in which the other signifies a life that is
both prior to and not subsumable by the unity of consciousness, let us return to Deleuze's
concept of the a priori Other-structure. We will see that for Deleuze also, the other
signifies or expresses difference beyond the actuality or unity of the experienced world.
This is a striking similarity between his own conception of the other and Levinas's.
However, we will also see that this difference that is beyond unity, this virtuality that
163 Levina s, "Awakening," 214 .
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subsists beyond the actual, is subsumed by unity . It cannot be subsumed all ai t once in a
single field of unity . But in any given field of unity virtualities are constantly being
actualized, just as other differences are constantly being released from the bClods of
actuality and returned to virtuality. This fluid interchange, involving both un.it.y and
difference, that Deleuze's other facilitates represents a significant departure rom
Levinas's conception of the other. In addition, Deleuze's a priori Other will .o ffer us a key
to understanding the crucial metaphysical codependence that holds between unity and
difference. I will argue that such a codependence, which implies that neither- unity nor
difference is metaphysically prior, is to be preferred over both Levinas's an cHDeleuze's
tendencies to assign priority to difference.
As the fundamental structure of the perceptual field, the a priori Other' is "the
condition of organization in general". 167 Various categories - including frin fge:-centre,
form-background, text-context, transitive states-substantive parts, and theme-potentiality -
are regarded as essential to the organization of perception.l '" These categori eS govern
how objects come to be constituted in space and time, and how experience can present to
us unified objects that appear within the context of a unified world. Deleuze: t e lls us that
the categories may be explained in one of two ways: they can be interpreted, f11onistically,
i.e. as immanent to the field of perception, or dualistically, i.e. as a set ofsuThjective
syntheses that are applied to raw, undetermined perceptual data .169 In the latt.er case, a
transcendental ego is invoked as the source of the a priori structures of exp er ience . For his
16 7 Deleuze, Logic, 307.
168 Ibid. , 308.
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part, Husser! maintains the dualism of transcendental ego and perceptual data .170Deleuze,
however, conceives these categories as immanent to the perceptual field, thereby forgoing
the strict dualism of a priori subject and constituted objects of experience. Deleuze makes
the categories dependent upon a generalized, or a priori, Other-structure rather than on a
universal subject which gives order to perceptual data.! 7! In this capacity, the a priori
Other is not just another category of perception like the others. It is the condition of the
possibility of the functioning of the categories. "It is the structure which conditions the
entire field" .172 Thus, at the most fundamental level, one's experience of the world, and
the constitution of oneself that accompanies this experience, requires that one exist in the
company of others. This fundamental sociality is displaced in Husser! by his invocation of
the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego.
As we will see, Deleuze's a priori Other-structure underpins the constitution of
objects, the temporal determination of experience, and the unfolding of possibility. It also
conditions desire in that desired objects are expressed by others in the form of possible
objects of perception. In fact, in its most general sense , the a priori Other is "the structure
of the possible".! 73 It expresses and gives existence to the po~sible in general. In addition,
objects, perceptions, and desires are all given measure, organization, and regulation by
the Other-structure. 174In short, it is the condition of the manifestation of both difference
and unity in the field of experience.
170 Ibid., 308-309.
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In order to understand how the Other-structure gives existence to the possible, we
must first understand how it conditions the perceptual field. Others give the world and our
experience of it unity by allowing our perceptions to be given against a background of
other things and ideas that we are not immediately aware of, that we do not immediately
perceive. This implicit background or horizon of other things and ideas is given to us as
immediately perceived by various others. 175 This is evident in the case of ordinary
material objects. The invisible sides of such objects are taken to be potentially visible
because one assumes that actual others already perceive these hidden sides, or that others
can at least potentially perceive them. In this way, the invisible world behind one's back
is anticipated as perceivable and given a certain reality and existence even though one
cannot directly experience it. 176 Thus, in the actual presence of others, or even with the
mere functioning of the a priori Other-structure in the absence of actual others, the world
is more than what is given immediately in experience. What is actually perceived is put in
relation with what can potentially be perceived. In other words, it is put in relation with
the possible or the virtual, that is, the differences yet to be actualized in a particular field
of perception. This means that our immediate perceptions are n.ot fundamentally divorced
from those perceptions that came before and those that will follow.
This means that by virtue of the a priori Other, continuity is established between
our ever-changing immediate perceptions. Transitions between them are smooth so that
the objects we perceive at different times maintain identity despite their varying
appearances. A new perspective on an object is therefore not perceived as a new object
175 Ibid., 305.
176 Ibid .
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because others are given as already having perceived this perspective. 177Others fill the
world out, allowing objects to change shape and form while maintaining identity. 178 They
make the unknown and unperceived relative because these are given as already known
and perceived by others. Others allow one to transition from one immediate perception to
another in a smooth and uninterrupted manner. Without others, this transition would be
violent. Each new moment would introduce a new and unexpected object into
consciousness. Others make the world more comfortable; they "introduce the sign of the
unseen in what I do see".1 79
While giving unity to what we perceive, other persons and the a priori Other-
structure also make possible the signification or anticipation of possible worlds apart from
what is immediately encompassed in the territory ofa self. Others are expressions of
possible worlds. A range of potential is made apparent in consciousness by means of this
a priori structure and the others that actualize it. Deleuze offers us the example of the
sudden appearance of a frightened face which utters the expression "I am frightened". 180
For Deleuze, this presents to experience the possibility of a new experience, a new world,
the possibility of a frightening world, or what we might also c~ll the possibility of a
frightened self. This face is a novel element, a new singularity introduced into the field of
experience, into the surveyor gathering-in that is the self. It expresses a possible
frightening world, or possible frightening object, that is not yet actual, not yet directly
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 306 .
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perceived by the subject. 181 As such, the face of the other acts as a bridge or mediator
between the territory ofa self that includes this other and som ething that lies beyond the
territory. This "something" is included in the territory of the other self. It might be, for
example, something the other has experienced in the past , the effect of which still lingers
on the face: a scar, an unsteady gaze, a bleak or stem countenance, or a lipstick smudge, a
smile , ajoyful glint in the eye. Here we see the crucial difference between Levinas and
Deleuze. For Levinas, the difference beyond unity that is signified by the other cannot be
brought within the unity of the self. For Deleuze, the difference beyond the unity of the
self that the other signifies is a potential part of the unity of the self. In addition, we see
that the difference that is expressed by the other, that which causes the other to be
frightened, does not subsist in pure difference. It is a difference that is actual in the
unified territory of the other. Thus, the other does not offer the self any access to pure
difference.
The fright that the other expresses has a particular structure. It does not resemble
or represent the frightening object that is expressed. Rather, the expression "implicates"
or "envelops" the expressed; the expressed is twisted or torsioned in its expression in the
face of the other l82 so that the expression does not have a relationship of resemblance to
the expressed. The other, as the expression of a possibility, is "the expressed, grasped as
not yet existing outside of that which expresses it" .183 That is, from the perspective of an
experiencing self, an expressed possible world exists only in that which expresses it.
181 Deleu ze, Logic, 307.
182 Ibid .
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Ther efore, it does not exist in actuality,184 except in a mediat ed form . It remains , as such,
a virtuality, a difference yet to be actuali zed, yet to be made consistent with the group of
other differences that compose the self in question . To make what is expressed actual, to
make the possible present, is to explicate the other. The possibl e is hereby developed and
reali zed .185
The concept of the a priori Other can also be understood as a principle of temporal
movement, a principle of the reconstitution of the selfin time. The other is an index of,
and an opening to, a possible way of being in the future . It allows for the passage from
one stage of self-composition to the next. Without the other one would be trapped in a
static world and a static self: "we would alwa ys run up against things, the possible having
disappeared". 186 We would run up against not onl y unexpected objects of perception that
impose themsel ves violently in our field of experi ence, but also against the fixed limits of
ourselves. For Deleu ze , if the other does not perform the function of facilitating temporal
movement and reconstitution, then something else must so that we can make sense of
what we perceive, i.e. the simultaneous unity and openness to change that characterize all
that we experience.
The self is at least doubl e in its movement and development in time. It is partially
annihilated by the virtual objects expressed by others , and partially remains stable as that
which was before the expression of a new virtuality. In this changing of the self there is
continuity, for the components that one is composed of do not change all at once , but a bit
at a tim e. Thu s, while there is no essential core to the self, there is a continuity maintain ed
18. Ibid., 307 .
185 Ibid.
186 Deleuze and Guattari, 19.
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over time. Our experience of the world is bound together in such a way that we do not
become entirely other when we create something new in thought or find our world
reconstituted as a result of an encounter with another person, place, or object. We do not
become completely other in the process of becoming. Rather, it might be said that we
become ourselves in a new way.
When I consider my own becoming I see that there have been noticeable shifts in
my ways of being. Elements and components have continuously been added and
subtracted. Up until some time ago, for instance, I had had little to no interest in political
action, or I was at least sufficiently convinced that any such action was futile. However,
in conjunction with studying political philosophy, I met someone who was fervently
engaged in political activism. I became close to this person and was deeply affected by
her conviction that it is indeed possible to affect changes on a broad scale in society.
Seeing her work for change, admiring the nobility of her efforts, and seeing the real
results of her efforts inspired me and convinced me that it is possible to enact my own
ideals, to persuade people that there are better ways of doing things. In this instance of
becoming-other, something of her, some part or component of her, resonated with some
part of me . A bridge was thrown out between us, as Deleuze and Guattari would say.
There was an overlap of her concepts or components and my own. In some small way we
became indiscernible from each other. As a result there was a reordering and
recomposition of the components that compose the event that is my own becoming.
However, in being influenced by this other person I did not thereby become this other
person. She indeed expressed the possibility ofa new world to me, a world of political
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activism, but I remained who I was to a very great extent. I can still argue politics with
her and we can certainly find much to disagree upon.
This fits very well, I think, with what Deleuze and Guattari are trying to tell us
about the nature of becoming. Becoming is not a complete reordering of components. Nor
is it a complete dissolution of the form or configuration of the components that make up
an individual or a situation. Rather, it involves slight or gradual adjustments, partial
deaths that alter to greater or lesser extents what we are. In order for me to maintain a
sense of myself throughout these changes there need only be consistency. That is, there
need only be some elements that remain the same while others are altered. This does not,
however, mean that there must be one or a few absolute components that never change.
As long as some components remain intact while others fluctuate, a sense of self, a sense
of continuity and consistency, is maintained. The definition of the self implied by
Deleuze and Guattari is therefore quite Wittgensteinian. Defining an identity does not
involve reducing it to an essence or soul that is essential for this identity to be what it is.
Rather, an identity is composed of many interwoven attributes or components, none of
which are absolutely essential to making the thing what it is.18~
To conclude this section, I will take note of some differences in how Husserl and
Deleuze conceive of our consciousness of others. The problem of solipsism that Husser!
must contend with in his account of the self-other relation is made irrelevant by Deleuze's
approach to the self-other relation. Deleuze's lack of concern with acquiring knowledge
of the other is a necessary consequence of his prioritizing of difference. In denying the
187 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The BIlle and Brown Books . 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwood, Publisher , 1969),
17; Idem, Philosophical Investigations , 3'd ed., trans . G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwood,
Publisher , 1967), sections 65-67 .
priority of unity, Deleuze ipso facto calls into question the possibility of truth and
certainty. The prioritizing of unity seems to be an essential correlate of the assumption
that certainty is possible. If difference is prior and all unities are in flux, then all that we
experience and know is provisional because there is no fixed measure or paradigm of
organization that can provide a definitive structure to differences. So Deleuze's lack of
concern with epistemology would seem to be a necessary consequence of his
prioriti zation of difference.188 He does not need others to be transparent to the self (they
can remain epistemologically ineffable). Instead, their major significance is that they
function to provide the material out of which a selfis composed and allow for the
recomposition of the self. In this sense, any selfis heteronomous, i.e. dependent on
otherness for its being.
Now, whereas for Husserl consciousness of an other qua transcendental ego is
mediate and indirect, for Deleuze the other person is immanent to the surveyed field,189
and therefore an immediate constitutive element of the self. This is not only true of other
persons. All perceived, experienced, or otherwise contracted objects are for Deleuze
immediate components of the self, although some play more i~timate roles than others .
Here we see that in Deleuze's account, the distinction between subject and object, as well
as self and other, is made less strict.
However, mediation is not entirely banished from Deleuze's account of
experience and unity, for there remains the distinction between the actual, or that which is
188 Whether certainty is made impo ssible by Oeleu ze's metaphysics, or if perhaps his metaphysics call for a
new kind of epi stemology and a new way of understanding truth, is an issue that requires exploration.
Unfortunately, there is not room in this paper for such an explora tion .
1890eleuze and Guattari ,47-48.
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taken up immediately in the survey that is the self, and the virtual , that which is beyond
the survey and which is expressed by the others included in the survey. It is important to
notice that the way in which Deleuze has employed the concept of the a priori Other-
structure suggests that there is no experience of pure unstructured difference. Differences
are either unified within the actual territory of a self or they are unified within the
territory of another self and expressed as virtualities in the field of actuality. In this
account of experience, pure difference is nowhere to be found . While Deleuze's essay on
Michel Toumier does address the idea of pure difference, it is done within the context of
a hypothetical world without others, a world that is beyond the purview of what we can
cal1 'experience' in the normal sense of the term .
2.9 The World Without Others, or Pure Difference Revisited
Before moving on to conclude this chapter and show finally how Deleuze's conception of
the self-other relation, construed as not requiring any notion of pure difference, allows us
to achieve an adequate concept of intersubjectivity, let us consider one last time the idea
of pure difference. We will tum first to Deleuze's account of pure difference in his essay
on Michel Toumier. I will argue that this account is inadequate if we wish to formulate a
concept of pure difference that is amenable to an account of experience that gives priority
to neither unity nor difference, but understands these as mutually implicating principles.
Furthermore, I wil1 contend that pure difference can be best understood as a sort of
regulative idea that is implied by our experience of unity and difference.
As we have seen , the a priori Other-structure organizes the perceptual field in such
a way that what is directly perceived is given as part of an implicit background of other
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entities and perspectives that can potentially be perceived. In this way, objects and the
world in general are given unity. An object that is perceived from many different
perspectives is the same object despite its varied appearances, and the totality of objects is
given as part of one continuously unfolding world. In "Michel Tournier and the World
Without Others", Deleuze experiments with the idea that in the absence of others and the
Other-structure, the world becomes fragmented, its unity lost. As Deleuze explains it, in a
world without others each moment, each perception becomes dissociated from all others .
The distinction between possibility and actuality is lost and each thing becomes a pure
difference that is incommensurable with everything else. We then have repetitions of pure
difference where the distances between entities cannot be bridged. 190 The once smooth
transitions from one thing to the next become harsh and violent. In the presence of others,
objects are presented as if in relief against a full background, a plenitude of possibility.
The a priori Other organizes depth so as to make our relation to it comfortable. There is
something in the depths of the world to be known and perceived.l " The other "fills the
world with a benevolent murmuring". 192 However, in the other's absence, perspectives
and objects become detached from one another. The unperceived is now an empty
abyss.l '" The appearance of a new object is sudden and violent because it exists only in
the moment of its perception. The presence of others foreshadows such objects, giving
them existence as possibilities before they become actual. But in a world without others,
transitions between the experienced and the unexperienced are not smooth. Objects
1900 eleuze, Logic, 307.
191 Ibid ., 3 15.
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contrast sharply. The unknown and unperceived are no longer expressed as virtuals or
potentialities. 194 There is only a direct relation to the eternal now of pure and
disconnected differences.
The absence of the Other-structure causes a change in the nature of time. In the
presence of others time continuously flows, advancing toward the future while leaving the
past behind. This movement of time is based on a distinction that Deleuze makes between
one's consciousness and its object of desire . A desired object , says Deleuze, is always
given in the form of a possibility expressed via another person . The object is therefore
future-oriented. It is something virtual and not yet actual. This means that consciousness
itself slips into the past. It is one's actuality, or what one is in abstraction from the new
possibility expressed through an other. 195 The "I" indicates only what was: "I was
peaceful", for example, before the expression of fright. 196 The Other-structure is therefore
a condition of temporal movement or "duration": the before and the after. 197
But the temporal continuity ofa selfis lost in the absence of the a priori Other .
With the loss of all possibility and virtuality that occurs in the absence of others, there can
be no mediation via others between consciousness and its virt~al objects of desire.
Consciousness becomes equal or limited to its immediate object, to what it perceives at
any given moment. With the introduction of each new object consciousness, and therefore
the self (but we cannot still speak of a self), is completely changed. It becomes
incommensurably different from what it was before. In this world without others, there is
194 Ibid .
195 Ibid ., 310 .
196 Deleu ze and Guattari , 18.
197 Deleu ze, Logi c, 311.
67
no sense of temporal movement. There is only an eternal now,198 an eternal repetition of
pure differences that are utterly discontinuous. In the absence of others, in the realm of
pure differences, we are outside of time, beyond duration.
When consciousness becomes equal to its objects of desire, it becomes impossible
to speak of consciousness and delimited objects any longer. Now we must speak of the
unconscious and the elements or differences that are the prior condition for the
composition of objects. In the presence of others there is consciousness, characterized by
a flow of time and objects that maintain identity throughout this flow of time. For
Deleuze, this arrangement is a sort of fiction because the flow of time and the objects we
are aware of in consciousness are the effects of the more fundamental reality of pure
difference. In the absence of others we would, according to Deleuze, become aware of
this underlying cause of the world of which we are conscious. Deleuze calls this the
unconscious. It is the "double" or "image" of the world of which we are conscious. In the
absence of others, there is neither a flow of time nor objects that remain identical
throughout this flow . Unity gives way to fragmentation . There is only the repetition of
pure difference. This is the unconscious, the "image" of the world that underlies and
causes the creative and productive processes that occur in experience.
This fragmentation of reality is the releasing of the elements from the confines of
bodies and objects. Elements are here synonymous with differences, pure difference. In
consciousness differences are subsumed and structured; 199 they are gathered and formed
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid., 302.
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into bodies and objects. 2ooThat is, they are made consistent with one another. The Other-
structure is the condition of this delimitation of objects and bodies , for objects become
discrete only in relation to the possible objects and perspectives that an other brings them
in relation to. To pass from one object to another requires that there be discrete objects .i'"
The Other-structure therefore binds differences together to form a world and subdivides
the world into its parts. A world of liberated differences is found when the world is
released from the structure imposed by others. Desire is no longer mediated by others and
directed toward possible objects. Desire becomes immediate. It is now oriented toward
the necessary, i.e. the disconnected elements or differences that compose all things. This
is an absolute deterritorialization in as far as the "territory" that designates a self becomes
completely decomposed. Its components no longer resonate in a single survey. Because a
territory also designates that which is actual, its complete decomposition marks the
impossibility of the distinction between the virtual and the actual.
I do not find the idea of a world without others to be a particu larly useful way of
understanding pure di fference or making it at all amenable to the account of experience
that Deleuze gives in "Michel Toumier and the World Withou: Others". That account
makes others an essential aspect of experience. A world without others is therefore
entirely beyond the bounds of normal experience.
A better way of construing the relation between pure difference and the unified
world of experience would be to characterize pure difference as unlimited possibility -
more specifically, as the unlimited possibility of relations between singularities or events .
200 Ibid., 312.
201 Ibid.
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Of course, we do not experience unlimited relations because only some relations are
actualized at any given time, just as only some possible relations are expressed in
actuality at any given time. With the concept of the a priori Other-structure, Deleuze has
argued that a condition of the possibility of experience is possibility itself, or that which is
not yet actual, relations not yet realized. The a priori Other-structure is the manifestation
or expression in time of this ultimate condition of experience. It gives possibility - the
future, or what is yet to come - reality and being. Experience is possible only if the world
is more than what we experience immediately, only ifit is part virtual, only ifit has an
element of possibility which is not represented or representable, but which is expressed
and produced in temporal experience. What makes experience possible is therefore
beyond immediate experience, but nonetheless expressed in experience via others.
Bruce Baugh calls a thing's openness to unlimited possible relations its
"rnultiplicity't.v" This is an event's capacity to change meaning by entering into new
relations with other events or singularities. This capacity characterizes all things. It is the
condition that allows concepts and selves to become, that is, to change components and
thereby redefine themselves. It is multiplicity that distinguish~s Deleuzian concepts and
selves from representational concepts and subjects. For Deleuze, concepts are not pre-
given unities or forms of possibility that structure the relations of sensible data in a
necessary manner. Through representation, however, possibility is conceived as strictly
limited, not just at any given moment, but also eternally because it asserts that
unchanging forms determine experience.
202 Baugh, 135.
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In the Deleuzian model of experience that we have advocated, possibility is
unlimited, although not at each particular moment. At any given moment, some relations
are actual and these actual relations open up a limited domain of other possible relations.
This can be seen in the example of the frightened face. Ifan actual relation has been
established with a certain frightened other, then the possibility is there for an actual
relation with that which causes the other to be frightened. This is how the other acts as a
conduit between different fields of unity. The same is true of concepts. What components
a concept includes at any given time will determine its becoming. What will be included
within a concept is therefore not determined by a fixed antecedent rule, that is, in a
sedentary or closed fashion. Rather, the composition of a concept is determined
nomadically, or in an open and changeable way. In other words, the rule that determines
membership in a set is in flUX. 203 The changing members themselves change the rule of
inclusion. This is why, on Deleuze's view, the here and now of empirical actuality has
such a great power of conditioning experience. Only certain possibilities of movement
and development are open to a selfat any given moment in virtue of its actually existing
relations. With each new moment the possibilities and the rule~ change because new
actualizations are realized. This is why Deleuze says that concepts are determined by
"local situations't.i'"
In representational models of thought, the relations between moments of
experience are internal to a transcendent concept or pre-given rule. These relations
therefore have a necessary form. Deleuzian relations are external to any fixed rule. The
203 Baugh, 136.
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relations themselves are prior to the rule and are the basis on which rules are made and
remade. The unlimited possibility of relations, or pure difference, is therefore implied as
an extreme possibility or regulative idea. However, in experience only some of these
possible relations can ever be actual. Our access to difference must therefore be mediated
because if we were to actually experience all possible relations simultaneously we would
exist beyond the bounds of time and history in the unstructured mess of pure difference.
Deleuze's account of selfhood is therefore inherently historical. Events , such as
concepts or selves, have an historical genesis, or causal history. Antecedent relations of
efficient causation account for the nature and occurrence of events. 20S Events relate and
conspire to produce new events as in a chain of causation. But the image of a chain of
events is really too simple and too linear to account for the complexity of the relations
involved in historical genesis. There is a complex interweaving of relations between
events, so complex that there is no necessary outcome of these relations. Genealogy is the
study of these material causes that bring about events. Genealogy does not see events as
new instances of concepts, nor as exceptions to conceptual rules, but as purely novel and
contingent results that create new unities.i'" In arguing for effi.cient causality, rather than
final and formal causality, Deleuze gives emphasis to being's capacity "to produce and to
be produced'Y '" in a manner that is spontaneous and which grounds the construction of
concepts.
We might understand the nature of De leuze's historicism better if we see it in
contrast with Hegel's way of conceiving history. For Hegel, the moments of historical
205 Baugh, 141 .
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development that are negated and synthesized are "intrinsically or logically related",208
rather than extrinsically related. This means that they are structured within the form that
the concept or Idea imparts to these determinate representations. This makes the process
and outcome of history necessary. Neither the moments nor the end are contingent causal
results ,209 for they are structured by a pre-given form and end . In this way, Hegel
accounts for phenomena, but at the same time sacrifices creativity and spontaneity. i' " For
Hegel, without the a priori Idea to structure representations, the empirical has no content
and cannot be considered knowledge. Taken on their own, each "this", or moment of
experience, is equal to any other "this", and yet they are all absolutely different. As such,
each is an "empty, negative universal' t." " or "indeterminate non_being,,;212 "[w]ith
respect to its utter indeterminacy and lack of content, being, the here and now existence
of something, is identical to nothing".213 For Hegel, to be meaningful and positive
instances of knowledge, sensations must be ordered through concepts. Otherwise, they are
merely accidental and can make no difference to knowledge. But for Deleuze, "[t]he
empirical [ .. .] must be thought even ifit cannot be known".214 That is, while the
possibility of knowledge may be hampered by the denial of the metaphysical priority of
unity, thought is yet faced with an even greater challenge: to discern the nature of events
which cannot be subsumed within any transcendent principle of unity . The challenge is to
think the particularity of an event without the help of a formal principle. On Deleuze's
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view, concepts can be explained, rather than taken for granted, if we look to the ways in
which rule governed systems take shape and develop in practice.
2.10 Deleuzian Community
Let us now consolidate what has been accomplished in this chapter. We have seen how
Deleuze displaces the priority of unity and makes difference a prior condition of unity.
We have used the idea of the construction of unities in time to develop a notion of how
the unity of the selfis constructed. Most essential and fundamental to the constitution of
any self are the differences that are gathered together and made to cohere. These are the
fundamental constituents of any self. A selfis literally nothing without them, not even an
empty form of consciousness. Other persons are instances of these fundamental
differences or constituents that compose selves. Therefore, we are all fundamentally
social and from the start constituted by our relations with others. Furthermore, in being
constituted by others, we simultaneously and reciprocally playa role in constituting
others. We impart to them features and components of ourselves. A consequence of
denying the metaphysical priority of unity has therefore been the displacement of the
epistemological importance of others in favour of an emphasis on the constitutive roles
that others play in the formation of selves. Following from this, it can be said that all
selves resonate loosely in a great fluctuating communal field of unity that can be
conceived narrowly as society, or more broadly as nature in its entirety. This is a
community that can only be accessed from within . One can have only a partial view of it.
Each self is but a small component territory of the whole . But the whole is not in any way
reducible to any of its parts . The selfis not categorically privileged in its reciprocally
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constituting interactions with others . This does not mean that reciprocation is necessarily
egalitarian. It probably rarely is. In some instances an other may exert more constitutive
power over a self, as in one's most formative years as a child. At times the self can be a
stronger force than the other. But the privileging of one party over the other is not
categorically in favour of the self, as it is in Husserl's static analysis . If the self is
privileged over the other, then this privilege is conditional. Relative to a different other, a
particular selfmay have less constitutive power. Or the self may undergo some
misfortune that leaves her less powerful. The hierarchies of constitutive power are
themselves in flux . This way of conceiving of a community and the interactions of its
members is made possible in Deleuze's thought not so much because he gives priority to
difference, but because he does not make difference subordinate to unity or reducible to
any unity, such as the ego, which would then have a categorical privilege in the
constitutive activity that is at the basis of the world and our experience of it. Rather than
needing the idea of the priority of difference, what we require for this conception that we
have achieved of the immanent constitution of an intersubjective community is the idea
that difference and unity are mutually implicating and codependent principles. This idea
allows us to conceive of unities as constituted by their relations with other unities . Ifwe
care to conceive of pure difference as unlimited possible relations, then we can say that
pure difference serves not so much as a necessary condition of the world as it appears, but
as a regulative idea implied by the world as we experience it.
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Conclusion
The problem that has been the impetus for the discussion in this thesis has been the
problem of how best to conceive the relation between self and other such that the concept
of community or intersubjectivity that follows is strong enough to allow that our societies
and the world in general are products of collective constitution and not reducible to the
constituting activity of the individual. Husserl and Deleuze both construct different ways
of conceiving the relation between self and other.
Husserl examines consciousness in detail and posits an autonomous and universal
subject as the necessary correlate of each and every intentional act of consciousness that
contributes toward the construction of the phenomena of the world. Not only is
consciousness necessarily consciousness ofsome object, but it is also necessarily
consciousness for some transcendental ego. Building upon these principles, Husserl
tackles the problem of the self-other relation and the intersubjectivity that can only be
understood on the basis of this relation. Throughout his examination of the meaning of
the other and of inter subjectivity, Husserl does not relinquish the primacy of the ego. The
other can be understood only as an analogue of the constituting ego. Whatever the other is
apperceived as constituting can only be derivative of what the ego has constituted or is
capable of constituting. There can never be any radical difference between the meanings
constituted by the ego and those constituted by the other. Because each other is really
capable of no more than the ego is capable of, the intersubjective community that
includes the original ego and all others is a community that is necessarily constrained by
the nature of the ego . Because all apperceived constitutions of meaning find their root in
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the transcendental ego, there can be no sensible notion of a collective constitution of
meaning derived from Husserl's phenomenology. In the reciprocal relations between
subjects, the ego is categorically privileged.
A Deleuzian examination of experience and perception leads us to posit a concept
of heteronomous selfhood as a more useful way of dealing with the problem of
reconciling the individual with the collective. With Deleuze, the self becomes invested in
otherness. Each self is fundamentally a gathering of otherness, a changeable composition
of components, none of which are essential to the make-up of the self. Here there is no
longer a strict distinction drawn between consciousness ofand consciousness for. The
components or objects that compose a self or territory, i.e. what one is immediately
conscious of, are equal to the self, i.e. who this consciousness is for. The selfis therefore
no longer a foundation upon which the world is constructed. The selfno longer conditions
the world in an absolute way, as had been the case for Husser!. Rather, the world
conditions the self. The selfis constructed through a selection of the components that
compose the world. With this reversal of the priority of self and other, of world and self,
that we have in Deleuze, we achieve what Husserl strove for, but could not accomplish.
We have in Deleuze a conception ofselfhood that takes account of the historically
changeable nature of the self, just as Husserl had done through his examination of
consciousness, and which also sees the world as not in any way pivoting on the
transcendent form of the self. Rather, the constitution of the world is conceived as being
conditioned by the collective desires of the many intermingling and co-inhabiting life
forms whose lives intricately penetrate one another and lead one another toward
reconstitutions with others and decompositions in otherness.
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Husserl's analysis examines the modifications that a universal, or static, subject
undergoes as it constitutes meaning. Even Husserl's genetic, or historical, analyses of
constitution maintain an element of the static subject as the necessary subject of all acts of
constitution. Deleuze's account of selfhood is truly genetic because its removes all
vestiges of the static subject. The Deleuzian self has no essential aspect, but is constantly
redefined by the changes it undergoes in time . Intersubjectivity not based on an
autonomous ego might still be, in a sense, homogeneous in that it has a single quality that
suffuses it and holds the different components together in a single survey. However, this
would be a homogeneity composed of heterogeneous components. Here, neither
difference nor unity takes priority. They are conceived as mutually implicating and
codependent principles that together allow us to achieve a purely immanent account of
the world as it appears to us.
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